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ABSTRACT 
L^ken, Scott Charles, M.A., May 1993 History 
Montana During World War II 
Director: Harry W. Fritz -Uj ' 
During World War IT a fundamental economic change occurred 
throughout the west but did not include the state of Montana. This thesis is an 
analysis and evaluation of Montanas' experience, using as primary tools the 
records of Montanas' production, the 16th and 17th census, and letters from 
the constituency of Montana Senator James E. Murray. Chapter 1 is an exami­
nation of Gerald Nash's thesis on the transformation of the west and how, if at 
all they pertain to Montana. 
K. Ross Toole once wrote that Montana "had little to do with how it 
developed and what it became." This fact holds true with Montana's experience 
during World War II. Chapters 2 and 3 examine the implementation and re­
sults of Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal policy. The ramifications of Roose­
velt's New Deal policy would further cement Montana to its primary economic 
base. Chapter 4 examines Montanas' early war mobilization efforts. Chapters 5 
and 6 evaluates Montanas' trials and tribulations during the war and how they 
effected domestic affairs. 
Montanas' war experience was not one of fundamental economic 
changes. Instead it was one of deprivation and sacrifice that were only over 
come by government intervention. This in turn thoroughly entrenched Montana 
in its traditional economic base. 
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Between 1939 and 1945, total war convulsed the world. The United States 
entered this world war on December 7, 1941. The participation of the United 
States brought tremendous changes to the country, particularly to its western states. 
Montana's war experience proved not to be one of new booming war industries or 
diversification of the population but, rather it was one of deprivation and sacrifice 
that was only over come by stronger government intervention. 
World War II created a boom for Montana's primary industry, agricul­
ture, and caused a massive drain in the state's valuable labor supply. It did not 
change Montana's reliance on agriculture to produce the bulk of its Gross Domes­
tic Product. The agriculture boom happened because of the design of a central 
planning process that began in Montana and the United States in 1932 with the 
election of Franklin D. Roosevelt as president. 
A contemporary western historian, Gerald D. Nash, puts forth the idea that 
the war was a catalyst for the diversification of the western states' primary eco­
nomic base, extractive industry. Nash states the war "transformed a colonial 
economy based on the exploitation of raw materials into a diversified economy that 
included industrial and technological components."1 Further, the war initiates a 
"significant population boom and brought unprecedented expansion to most west­
ern cities."2 With this expansion came a broadening of the region's ethnic diversi­
ty. This statement holds true only if the West is looked at as a single unit. But for 
individual states that comprise the west, this was not the case. This was not the 
case for the state of Montana. Montana's history of natural resource exploitation, 
with investment capital coming from outside the state, does not lead towards diver­
l 
sification of extractive industry. Also, Montana s geography, location, and climate 
were not conducive to the new industries developed during the war. Montana's 
history contains the elements of exploitation of land and people. Montana's histori­
ography leads to direct government involvement in the financing and direction of 
the state. Government planning did not diversify Montana's economy. Instead, it 
further entrenched Montana in its traditional economic position, that of a producer 
of commodities. The events of World War II further depressed Montana to even 
deeper levels of heteronomy.3 The effects of the war also furthered the agricultural 
adjustments that had begun during the Depression of the 1930's. By 1945 the 
average farm size in Montana had grown to over 1,500 acres, and 64 percent of the 
farms reported using tractors.4 
When the war ended in the fall of 1945, Montana was still heavily reliant 
on its ability to produce commodities. In fact the war had enhanced this reliance. 
Montanans were even more able to handle the new pressures brought on by the 
war's demand of increased production. Montana continued on the path dictated by 
mother nature and financed by the federal government. In the end, Montana still 
produced commodities, but only this time bigger and better. 
The state of Montana is a prime example of one state's inability to take a 
quantum jump toward economic diversification and population heterogeneity. 
World War II did not diversify Montana's economy. Nor did it make Montana's 
population more heterogeneous. Instead, it reinforced Montana's colonial status in 
the greater American economy. Further, it depressed the population and the state 
to deeper levels of heteronomy. Montana did not leap to economic diversification 
or population heterogeneity because its geography and history put it at a disadvan­
2 
tage. Montana's primary economic base lay in labor intensive agriculture. Bureau­
cratic red tape hamstrung Montana, despite the monetary injections that accompa­
nied central planning. These facts follow closely K. Ross Toole's assertion that 




The Nash Thesis 
Looking back at World War II, it is obvious that the war brought funda­
mental changes to America. How and why did these dramatic changes occur? From 
where did the Oregon ship building facilities, the Richmond, California plants, 
Colorado's Rocky Flats Arsenal and New Mexico's Los Alamos Nuclear Research 
facilities come? Who paid the bill? How did these projects affect the composition 
of the American West? Why are there no new war industries in Montana? These 
question and many more are given plausible answers by Professor Gerald Nash of 
the University of New Mexico. Nash has written two books that illuminate the 
demographic and economic effects of World War n on the American West. 
In Nash's first book, The American West Transformed, he argues that 
World War II directly accelerated the diversification of the economies and popula­
tions of the western states. If not for the war, Nash states, these changes "would 
have taken more then three generation in peacetime."1 In The American West 
Transformed Nash looks at eleven western state: California, Washington, Oregon, 
Nevada, Idaho, Utah, Montana, Colorado, Wyoming, Arizona and New Mexico. 
Nash describes the west before the war as "still a very much under de­
veloped region, a colony dependent on the older East for much of its economic 
well being."2 The Government's direct, strategic needs for absolute victory in 
Europe and the Pacific demanded drastic changes in the location of manufacturing 
and research facilities. Nash contends that, with a full fledged war in the Pacific 
and European theaters, the existing manufacturing infrastructure could not fill the 
4 
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need for total victory. Because of this direct need for war goods, and the western 
states desire to better their economic position, redistribution began. 
Redistribution of strategic production triggered the process of diversifying 
the western economies,3 and "a spectacular population boom in the west."4 
However,it also depopulated states like Montana. Nash attributes this mass migra­
tion, which the country had not experienced since the decade after the First World 
War, to the "expansion of industries, such as shipbuilding and aircraft manufactur­
ing."5 These war industries offered better pay and a chance for a person to better 
his lot in life. Montana had no ocean for ship building, no Howard Hughes to 
finance aviation technologies, and no Henry J. Kaiser to develop a manufacturing 
infrastructure. Montana also lacked the proper infrastructure to support any activity 
other then agriculture and extractive industry. Even with Montana Senator James 
E. Murray at the head of the Small War Plants Corporation, industrial diversifica­
tion bypassed Montana, while at the same time siphoning off its volatile labor 
force. With the accelerating potential of regions other then Montana, the nation's 
labor supply began to flood into areas promising higher wages. The new people 
were not only white Anglo Americans, but also Hispanic, black Americans and 
Mexican nationals. The demand for labor reached such an extreme pinnacle that 
the doors to opportunity were flung wide open. All walks of humanity rushed 
through to descend with relentless force on unprepared western cities and towns. 
Nash explores this phenomenon and how it affected western states and their 
cities. He illuminates the solutions the states adopted to adjust to this explosive 
problem. In California, Nash describes the inability of the Safeway store in Loma 
Vista to serve the shopping needs of the newly arriving workers for Consolidated 
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Vultees Corporation and Ryan Aeronautical Corporation. The store had only five 
checkout lanes to accommodate 16,000 people.^ Nash shows how crime, finances 
and housing shortages affected the producing capabilities of California. Nash then 
applies this anatomical method to the Pacific Northwest, Mountain States, and the 
Southwest. When Nash addresses the Mountain States he discusses Colorado,and 
more precisely Denver. Why did he not look at the other Mountain States, like 
Montana? The reason is that states like Montana and Wyoming did not fall into the 
scope of Nash's anatomical review. They were casualties of this great shift that 
was occurring in America. 
Throughout his book Nash considers American minorities, principally black 
Americans and Native Americans. Nash illuminates how the war opened opportuni­
ties for them in areas which had traditionally been dominated by white Americans, 
primarily in the military and organized labor. These impacts have no direct bearing 
on Montana. Nash takes a sympathetic look at the plight of the Japanese Ameri­
can, but makes no mention of their much-appreciated help in the sugar beet fields 
of Montana. In light of the ever-growing Spanish-speaking population in the west, 
Nash notes that the war brought their plight to light.7 "World War II had a liberat­
ing effect on Spanish-speaking Americans" he writes.8 It "changed the aspiration 
of Hispanics, heightened their ethnic awareness,and accelerated their 
assimilation."9 Nash's last three chapters look at science in the west, which had no 
effect on Montana but greatly transformed the southwest and pacific northwest. 
Nash also treats culture and entertainment in the west. The war affected and 
enhanced what America accepted as culturally entertaining. Again, this had no 
positive effect on Montana other than to intensify patriotic fever. The reality of this 
7 
cultural swing reinforced the desire of Montana's predominantly rural population to 
leave and seek prosperity in urban centers. This exodus pushed Montana to a 
deeper level of heteronomy, and forced the state to remain rural and isolated. Nash 
closes his book by reiterating the positive changes that had taken place in the west 
due directly to the war. The west "emerged from the war as a path-breaking self 
sufficient region with unbounded optimism for the future."1® This may have been 
what happened in California, Washington, and New Mexico, but it did not happen 
to the state of Montana. At the close of the war, Montana remained dependent on 
agriculture as its primary industry just as it had before the war. 
Nash's second book, World War H and The West: Reshaping The Economy 
is primarily a reiteration of his first book. Although he goes deeper into the effects 
of shipbuilders like Henry J. Kaiser, Todd Shipyards, and S. D. Bechtel on Ameri­
ca's wartime economy, his conclusions reflect those of his first book. Nash is 
correct in saying that the war "left an indelible imprint on the economy. No other 
event in the twentieth century had such far-flung influence."11 But the fact remains 
that the Montana economy had not been diversified by the war. In 1946, Monta­
na's economic existence still depended on agriculture and the extraction of raw 
materials for the bulk of its Gross Domestic Product (see Chart A, appendix A). In 
a 1962 study on the Changes in the Location of Manufacturing in the United States 
Since 1929. Victor R. Fuch found that Montana suffered the loss of 34 percent of 
value added by manufacturing between 1929 and 1954 (see Table 1, Appendix A). 
On the other hand, Fuch's study illustrated that the west as a unit had a compara­
tive gain of 36.7 percent, or a $4,41 billion in value added (see Chart B, Appendix 
A). Unlike other Western states, however, Montana did not diversify its economy 
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during the war. It constituted an exception, an uncommon example. 
Nash's interpretation has been carried on by several contemporary western 
historians. Richard Lowitt, Richard White, and Montana's own Michael P. Malone 
have incorporated the Nash thesis in their latest works on the American west.12 
Like Nash, these historians neglected to take an in depth look at the state of 
Montana and the effects World War II had on its economy and people. The neglect 
of Montana in the works of the aforementioned historians is the primary result of a 
lack of research. The experience of Montana in World War n is rich with econom­
ic and population adjustments and deserves further development. 
CHAPTER 2 
Montana and the New Deal 
The 1930's continued the dire straits that plagued Montana through the 
1920's: drought, poverty and an overall collapse of the state's primary economic 
base, agriculture. By 1931, Montana's leading industry, agriculture, had lost over 
$30 million in annual income compared to 1930 (see Table 2, Appendix A). The 
loss in agricultural income is best reflected in the annual income of Montana 
farmers (see Table 3, Appendix A). By 1932 Montana farmer's had their annual 
income slashed by almost 53 percent from 1930. Farmers were being crushed by 
nationwide depression. 
Mining, Montana's second leading industry, lost $27 million in 1931. Table 
4 in Appendix A illustrates the drastic decline of production in the Montana mining 
industry. The statistics illustrated in Tables 2 and 4 were devastating for a state 
cemented to these industries for its existence. The ramifications of this decline can 
be observed in the rate of commercial failures in the state. Between 1930 and 1932 
Table 5, Appendix A shows Montana had 411 commercial failures with over $4.7 
million in liabilities. Retail sales in the state dropped well over $3 million (Table 
6, Appendix A). Railroad revenue fell by almost $4.5 million (Table 7, Appendix 
A). This decline in the ability to produce not only had drastic effects on the state, 
it also directly affected the Federal Government's ability to collect taxes. Table 8 
in Appendix A indicates that the Federal Government lost over $1.7 million in 
collectible taxes by 1932. The state of Montana desperately needed outside help; it 
could not rectify its situation on its own. The end result of this continued economic 
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deprivation was to push Montana deeper into depression. 
1932 was an election year in the United States. The results of the election in 
November pushed Hoover and the Republicans out and ushered in Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and his New Dealers. According to Otis L. Graham, in his book Toward 
A Planned Society. "Planning has components, intellectual and institutional."1 
Graham states further that "planning assumes modern industrial society requires 
public intervention to achieve national goals;. . . such intervention must touch all 
fundamental social development; must be goal oriented, and effectively coordinated 
at the center; must be anticipatory."2 The election results in November put Roose­
velt in control of the institutions needed to follow Graham's anatomy of planning. 
President Roosevelt proclaimed early in his reign that "action and action now" is 
the solution. We must "move as a trained and loyal army willing to sacrifice for 
the good of the common discipline." 3 
In 1933, the newly elected Democratic administration inherited a gargan­
tuan problem: nationwide depression. Addressing this problem in the most effec­
tive and expedient manner became the administration's primary objective. Presi­
dent Roosevelt called for a plan that required the intervention of the Federal 
Government on a scale comparable to that of World War I. Roosevelt became 
convinced that planning was "the way of the future." 4 
President Roosevelt's New Deal Government looked back at the war mobi­
lization efforts of World War I for the answer to the stifling problems of depres­
sion.5 The results of the effort at planning during World War I had profound 
effects on the political elite in the United States. It also affected the perception of 
American business. The war had been "a revelation in the advantages of an 
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economy managed through Government and Business cooperation".6 This revela­
tion was permanently placed in the minds of both business and government. This 
revelation also brought to light the "failure of American husbandry under a free 
market economy'1.7 
In June of 1933, "talk had become law" with the National Recovery Admin­
istration.8 The New Deal began with "National goals" including "full employment" 
and "rising mass consumption."9 Furthermore, the Roosevelt administration strong­
ly believed that a recovery policy should "involve fiscal and monetary policies, 
agriculture, transportation and energy policies."10 With the creation of the N.R.A. 
in 1933, the New Dealers turned their vision into national policies to guide Ameri­
ca to prosperity. 
Within the folds of the New Deal lay the Agricultural Adjustment Adminis­
tration, "the most important experiment" for states like Montana.11 The idea 
behind the A.A.A. was to control production and curtail waste.12 This was not 
effective in states like Montana where between 1930 and 1939 drought, wind, and 
pestilence dictated the production of agricultural commodities. Nevertheless, the 
A.A.A. was inviting to the Montana farming community. Along with planning 
came benefit payments which raised the personal income of the farmer. Table 3 in 
Appendix A illustrates that by 1934, the average cash income of Montana's farm­
ers had increased by 74 percent over 1932. By 1935, the farmer had increased his 
income 93 percent since the election of President Roosevelt. Montana farmers 
continued to prosper until the recession of 1937-38 slightly constricted growth. 
By 1940, the farmer had increased his cash income 179 percent from 1932 
(see Table 3, Appendix A). In Montana, farmers who were on solid ground re­
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ceived $56.4 million in A. A.A. relief between 1934 and 1940 (see Table 9, 
Appendix A). On the down side, the A.A.A. required the implementation of 
acreage reduction policies. Subsidies were insufficient to keep Montana farmers on 
the land when faced with acreage reduction policies.13 In Montana between 1930 
and 1940 5,672 farms ceased to operate, a 12 percent decrease (see Table 10, 
Appendix A). Fifty-four percent of the farmers had a farm mortgage debt. The 
average debt equaled $3,800 for an owner operated farm of 441 acres.14 If a 
farmer is asked, or better yet told, to reduce seeded acreage, the farmer's ability to 
make payments to the bank is greatly reduced. The farmer is then left with no 
other real choice than to sell and move on. The evidence indicates that the A.A. A. 
played an important role in the farmer's decision to leave the farm. The effects of 
Roosevelt's New Deal program, particularly the A.A.A., proved contradictory to 
many Montana farmers. The A.A.A. did facilitate survival for the Montana farmer 
who was on solid ground with no debt. 
The mining industry in Montana began to decline drastically in the first part 
of the 1930s (see Table 4, Appendix A). In 1934, Montana produced 31,632 short 
tons of copper. Table 11 in Appendix A indicates that this is just a third of what 
was mined in 1930. In 1934, through the diligent efforts of Montana's Senator 
Burton K. Wheeler, the President reluctantly signed the Silver Purchase Act of 
1934.15 The Federal Government agreed to "purchase 287 million ounces of silver, 
nearly the entire production of the western mines, at a purchase price well above 
the market value."16 The Silver Purchase Act of 1934 allowed the miner to contin­
ue mining silver and other minerals that derived from silver-copper, zinc and 
lead.17 Without this Act the mining industry may have collapsed. In Montana, 
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annual mining income jumped to over $82 million by 1937, a 332 percent increase 
from 1932 (see Table 4, Appendix A). The New Deal's reluctant concession to 
silver saved Montana's mining industry from total collapse. In 1939, the mining 
industry received further assistance from the Federal Government through the 
enactment of the Strategic Minerals Act. This act authorized "the U.S. Bureau of 
Mines and the U.S. Geological Survey to engage in accelerated prospecting for 
new mineral sources and to provide scientific information for prospectors, particu­
larly small operators."18 The results of these two pieces of legislation can be seen 
in Table 4 in Appendix A. 
By 1934, 25 percent of Montana's population was receiving Federal 
Emergency Relief19, to the tune of $5.5 million (see Table 9, Appendix A). Table 
9 shows that in 1935 relief from the Federal Government rose to $16.8 million, 
further illustrating the dire straits afflicting the state. 
Between 1934 and 1941, Montana received $38.4 million for its Civilian 
Conservation Corp., $2 million for public buildings, $6 million for reclamation 
projects, and $62.4 million for its Works Progress Administration. Add to this 
another $18.8 million for its Public Works Administration. The biggest receipt for 
Federal aid in Montana came from the War Department, which expended $116 
million between 1934 and 1939 (see Table 9, Appendix A). The bulk of this 
money found its way into the development and construction of the Ft. Peck Dam, 
which had a price tag of $100 million,20 and employed 7,000 men in 1934.21 
The New Deal not only provided emergency relief for Montana, it also 
appropriated money to further upgrade Montana's infrastructure. Table 12 in 
Appendix A shows that between 1934 and 1937, Montana received almost $28 
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million for highway construction and maintenance. This aid continued until 1941. 
Overall, Montana received $33.5 million to improve its highway system. With 
these Federal dollars Montana improved or constructed 2,756 miles of highway. 
In retrospect, the accomplishments attained in Montana in the decade of the 
1930s could not have been achieved without the direct involvement of the Federal 
Government. With its direct guidance and monetary injection of $434.4 million be­
tween 1934 and 1941, Montana rebuilt and reorganized its fragile economy (see 
Table 9, Appendix A). The injection of New Deal money permitted Montanans to 
remain in their state rather then to leave. 
The lack of outward mobility can be observed in the 1940 census. Montana 
recorded a 4.1 percent growth compared to the 2.1 percent loss recorded in the 
1930 census.22 Some of Montana's growth in 1940 may have come from newly-
arriving people but that information will not be available until 2015. Nevertheless 
Montana did show a substantial growth in 1940. Table 13 in Appendix A illustrates 
population growth in the counties of Montana. Substantial growth occurred in 
Missoula, Flathead and Valley. 
Montana also showed a dramatic change in its farm sizes and numbers. In 
1930, Montana had 47,495 farms in operation, taking up 44,659,152 acres of 
land.23 Of these 47,495 farms 41 percent were from 100 to 499 acres in size. 
Twenty-two percent of Montana's farms were in the 1000 plus acreage group. By 
1940, Table 14 in Appendix A illustrates that Montana suffered a 21 percent 
decrease in farms 100 to 499 acres in size. Farms 1000 acres plus show a slight 
gain of one percentage point above 1930. The biggest increase though, came in 
farms 3 to 9 acres, which recorded a 77 percent increase. Overall, Montana suf­
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fered a 12 percent decrease in the number of farms in operation by 1940. This 
phenomena can be partially explained by population adjustments from rural to 
urban areas. 
In 1930, Montana was 66 percent rural and 34 percent urban.24 Looking at 
the 66 percent rural we find 28 percent were living on non-farms, with the remand­
ing 38 percent living on income producing farms.25 By 1940, after the traumas of 
the 1930s, Montana illustrates a fundamental shift in population. In 1940, 4 per­
cent of Montana's rural population moved to an urban setting. This however, does 
not completely reflect the 6 percent that left the farm. Two percent of those leaving 
the farm moved to rural non-farms.26 This then provides a plausible answer to the 
increase of farms in the 3 to 19 acres group (see Table 10, Appendix A). The New 
Deal and its monetary injection performed agricultural Darwinism on Montana's 
farmers. By 1940 the farms in the group of 100 to 999 acre had a 51.2 percent 
decline (see Table 10, Appendix A). This redistribution of lands brought Monta­
na's overall farm mortgage debt down 4.2 percentage points.27 
The decrease in farm size along with the mortgage reduction owed by 
Montana farmers can be seen in the move toward mechanization of Montana farms. 
In 1930 only 29 percent of Montana farms had a truck on the farm. By 1940 truck 
use rose to 43.8 percent.28 Tractor use on Montana's farms by 1940 had risen to 
47.6 percent compared to 36 percent in 1930. By 1940, 28 percent of Montana 
farms had electricity.29 The experiences of the Depression in the 1930s nudged 
Montana's farmers to move toward mechanization. Still, by 1940 less than half of 
Montana's farmers had tractors and trucks. Over half of Montana's agricultural 
commodities were still sown and harvested with traditional methods that required 
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intensive manual labor. 
The Depression appears to have had little effect on Montana's available 
labor force. Table 14 in Appendix A indicates that the labor force in Montana 
actually rose by 7,000 people by 1940. This rise can be explained by looking at the 
specific age groups that make up the available work force. Generally, if a person is 
between the ages of 15 and 64 years, that individual is eligible to work. In the 
1930s this group comprised 65.3 percent of the population. By 1940, this group 
totaled 68.2 percent of the population, almost a 3 percent growth in ten years. This 
growth came at the expense of the group 15 and under, which by 1940 had fallen 
from 29.7 percent to 25.4 of the population (see Table 15, Appendix A). Monta­
na's labor force had statistically grown stronger during the depression years. This 
growth in available labor can best be illustrated in the number of unemployed. In 
June of 1940, a prime time to be employed, Montana had well over 25,000 unem­
ployed workers, up nearly 2000 from 1939 (see Table 16, Appendix A). This large 
number is due to the fact that Montana's labor force lacked marketable skills other 
then those of manual labor. This situation was enhanced by mechanization on the 
farm and in the mines. Montana's population may have grown, but the marketable 
skills that Montanans possessed had not kept up with the pace of population expan­
sion. 
In 1940, Montana had a population of 559,456 persons. Of that, 53 percent 
were male.30 Table 17, in Appendix A illustrates that within this group 62 percent 
were employed in the civilian work force, with almost 18 percent unemployed. 
Looking at the vocations involving this 62 percent, it is found that 37 percent are 
engaged in agriculture, a phenomenal amount but not so unusual for Montana, 
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historically rural and agrarian. 
In Montana in 1940 over half (54 percent) of the male population was 
married.31 This fact plays heavily when searching for a job to support a family. 
The male in Montana is at a disadvantage here. The biggest detriment is his lack 
of an educational background that would enable him to seek out jobs other then 
those associated with manual labor. In 1940, only 5 percent of the males in Monta­
na had a college education. A large portion, 38 percent, had an eighth grade educa­
tion.32 Montana males were limited to the existing extractive industries, and they 
did not pay very well. Mine work paid $6.75 a day,33 or $40.50 a week before 
taxes. Workers in the primary industry, agriculture, brought home between $60 
and $80 a month, depending on room and board.34 The options available were 
bleak at best, as reflected in the per capita income for Montana wage workers. In 
1940 the average Montanan earned $574, a 10 percent increase from 1939, but a 5 
percent decrease from 1929 (see Table 18, Appendix A). 
Montana greatly benefited from New Deal expenditures. New roads were 
built, new government and civic buildings were constructed, all at the expense of 
the Federal Government. Montana also lost in the 1930s. The top two industries in 
Montana, agriculture and mining, existed on Federal subsidies, without which they 
could not have survived. The aid farmers received through the A.A.A. allowed 
them to stabilize and increase Montana's agriculture revenue (see Table 2, Appen­
dix A). The events of the 1930s brought Montana further under the wing of the 
Federal Government. The economic controls of the 1930s would seem like friendly 
advice compared to the total and absolute control the Government would extend 
during World War Two.35 
CHAPTER 3 
Harvesting New Deal Prosperity 
Montana entered the 1940s on relatively stable ground. With the help of the 
federal government's New Deal policies, Montana was able to shore up its extrac­
tive industries, agriculture and mining. By 1940 Montana's primary economic base 
was firmly established. Nearly 40 percent of the eligible labor force of Montana 
was employed in agriculture. Agriculture in turn accounted for 35 percent of wages 
earned in the state. Trades and services were the second ranking source of income, 
at 23 percent, followed by government payments. Manufacturing in Montana 
placed fourth and last in revenues generated, accounting for a lowly 6.2 percent 
(see Chart A, Appendix A). The income payments in Montana break up into four 
categories: Wages and Salaries, Proprietors' Income, Property Income, Other 
Income. Table 19 in Appendix A indicates that Wages and Salaries account for 
56.4 percent of all income. Proprietors' Income takes second with 26.2 percent, 
Property Income placed third at 9.3 percent, and Others' is fourth with 8.1 per­
cent. Over half of the dollars earned by Montanans came through wages and sal­
aries. More then 30 percent of those wage workers were employed in the primary 
industry, agriculture. The remaining wage workers' success is closely tied to the 
advancements made by the farmer and the miner. 
By 1940 Montana's agricultural income had risen to well over $96 million, 
the highest it had been in ten years (see Table 2, Appendix A). The steady climb in 
agriculture income in Montana could be attributed to Federal money received 
though the A.A.A. In 1940 this aid hit a record $16.1 million, almost double the 
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$8.6 million Montana received in 1939 (see Table 9, Appendix A). With this aid 
and Montana's bumper crops in 1940, agricultural in-put to Montana's Gross 
Domestic Product catapulted to over $96 million. Montana farmers and ranchers 
had achieved maximum results in their efforts at husbandry. Cattle on the farm 
increased by 142,000 head from 1,006,000 to 1,148,000, with a value of $52.5 
million. This is up almost $12 million from 1939 (see Table 20, Appendix A). 
Sugar beet tonnage increased by 272,000 tons over 1939, with an increase of 9,000 
acres in production. The value of this crop climbed over $5.5 million (see Table 
21, Appendix A). In the production of all wheat in Montana the farmer benefited 
from the $2,933 increase in value added. The increase was achieved by adding a 
small 516 acres into wheat production and sufficient spring rains. The implementa­
tion of these two elements in turn increased the bushels harvested to 51,676 in 
1940. The end result created a 5,564 bushel increase over 1939 (see Table 22, 
Appendix A). Montana farmers also increased their irrigated lands by 26.5 percent 
over 1930.1 The increase of irrigated lands allowed the Montana farmer to take 
tremendous steps toward maximum production of Montana's semi-arid farm lands 
in the east. The reward for this outstanding effort was a $2,679 average income for 
Montana farm owners. This is a 25 percent increase from 1939, and a 179 percent 
increase since Roosevelt took office in 1932 (see Table 3, Appendix A). In 1940, 
the mining industry in Montana also increased its annual income. Again, mining 
industry stability relied on gracious assistance from the Federal Government with 
its enactment of the Silver Purchase Act of 1937 and the Strategic Minerals Act of 
1939. Montana miners produced 252.5 million pounds of copper at a value of 
$28.5 million, an increase of 57 million pounds, and $8.2 million in value from 
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1939 (see Table 23, Appendix A). Zinc was up almost 18 thousand tons from 
1939. The value of this mineral rested at $6.7 million, up over $3 million from 
1939 (see Table 24, Appendix A). Lead ore increased by 6,481 short tons in 1940, 
with $747,430 in value added over the 1939 record (see Table 25, Appendix A). 
The net result of the miners' endeavor reaped $79.5 million in annual income in 
1940, an increase of 25 percent over 1939 (see Table 4, Appendix A). It would 
appear that the mining industry, like agriculture, had weathered the turbulence of 
the 1930s, with the aid of the Federal Government. Through its financial support 
and gracious legislation the mining industry in Montana stepped into 1940 with a 
less-clouded future. The future may have appeared clearer in 1940, but the end 
result of the 1930s and its New Deal policies had further pushed Montana's mining 
industry to a deeper level of heteronomy, making it even more reliant on the 
Government's purchasing policies to keep it afloat. Nevertheless, Montana as a 
whole did make substantial economic gains by 1940. 
With positive advances made in agriculture and mining, the rest of Monta­
na's economy began registering some success. Montana's retail sales jumped 
almost 6 percent over 1939 with $11.4 million in sales (see Table 6, Appendix A). 
1940 also saw the business environment begin to grow with thirty-seven new estab­
lishments, recording only twelve failures having liabilities of $57,000. Figures 
from 1939 show fifteen business failures with liabilities of $106,000 (see Table 5, 
Appendix A). In 1940, Montana further improved 453 miles of road with the $5.1 
million it received from the Federal Government (see Table 12, Appendix A). 
These improvements in road conditions in Montana increased tourist travel in the 
state. In 1940, Montana welcomed 1.8 million tourists who spent $28.5 million. 
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This is nearly 800,000 more tourists plus $5.5 million than in 1939 (see Table 26, 
Appendix A). The industry extracts only photographs and fond memories from the 
state. Montanans were also building homes and buildings for business. In 1940, 
1,595 building permits were issued. These permits were valued at $4.8 million. 
This is $2.3 million more in value added over 1939 (see Table 27, Appendix A). 
These remarkable success stories happening in Montana in 1940 might give 
one the impression that Montana was on its way up and out of the depression. This 
perceived advance was put in check by events happening outside of Montana, and 
outside of America. The war in Europe was beginning to escalate. 
CHAPTER 4 
Early War Mobilization 
Americans read with great excitement about events in Europe in 1940. In 
the spring, the Germans seized Denmark and Norway, greatly unnerving the Presi­
dent of the United State.1 France fell in June. Germany bombed England and its 
capital city, London.2 Submarine wolf packs attacked American merchant ships. 
These German U-boats caused tremendous losses to Allied shipping. The U-boats 
sank on average 450,000 tons a month, a rate "four times as fast as the ships could 
be replaced".3 These events accelerated the preparations for war in the United 
States. The miserable position of America's allies, England and France, propelled 
the President and Congress into action. America began to beef up its defenses in 
preparation for war. 
American involvement in this European conflict was at first not accepted by 
main street America. Americans had soundly defeated the "Huns" of Kaiser 
Wilhelm in 1917-18. Main street America was of the opinion that we did not again 
belong "over there". There was enough to deal with here at home. Further, popu­
lar opinion held that the great distance that separated the two continents was buffer 
enough to protect America from being sucked into the vortex of the war in 
Europe.4 This was not the conviction of the President of the United States. 
War mobilization began in 1939 when Roosevelt created the War Resource 
Board.5 Big business heavily dominated this Board. It recommended to the presi­
dent the development of a war-based economy that was geared towards rearma­
ment. The President ignored the request until the turn of events in Europe in the 
spring of 1940 forced him into action.6 In May of 1940, Roosevelt resurrected the 
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almost-forgotten Council of National Defense. The president thus released himself 
from the obligation to appear before Congress to request authorization to mobilize. 
He kept a low profile on mobilization; it would not interfere with his bid for re­
election in 1940.7 The Council of National Defense occupied itself through the fall 
of 1940 by awarding contracts and determining priorities.8 By June the American 
regular army stood at 375,000 men.9 In August Congress ordered the "mobiliza­
tion of the National Guard; six weeks later Selective Service" was called into 
action.10 To counteract the Germans' attacks on American merchant ships and to 
give desperately-needed aid to our Allies abroad, President Roosevelt signed the 
Lend-Lease Act in March, 1941.11 "This decision is the end of any attempts at 
appeasement in our land" stated Roosevelt, "the end of urging us to get along with 
dictators; the end of compromise with tyranny and the forces of oppression." 12 
President Roosevelt took the initial step to bring the United States closer to total 
involvement in the European war. Other war-related activities appeared in Wash­
ington, D.C., in early 1940. 
News of possible war mobilization traveled fast. Any senator who might 
possibly gain by having a war plant in his back yard was on the hunt for contracts. 
Montana's James E. Murray was one of these. 
Murray wrote President Roosevelt in May of 1940 in regard to his proposal 
to develop a committee on small business. The president agreed and gave Murray 
his full support. In September of 1940 a committee on small business was estab­
lished. Murray headed the committee and appointed James Mead of Billings, 
Montana, as executive secretary.13 Murray's committee immediately began to 
examine the economies of the west. It began to collect volumes of testimony.14 
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That following August, Congress created the Defense Plant Corporation to "expe­
dite the lagging mobilization program." Over the course of the war, the Corpora­
tion would invest $1.9 billion in the west.15 Surely with Senator Murray heading a 
committee on small war plants, Montana would benefit. 
Murray's committee sought to divert the millions of dollars in war contracts 
to the small manufactures of the west. In the spring of 1941, Murray wrote R.E. 
Towel, the Administrative Director of Defense Contracts in the service Office of 
Production Management in Helena, Montana. Murray related a conversation he 
had with a Mr. Nehemkis who was working in the War Department at the Penta­
gon, involving the employment of Montana's idle plants. Nehemkis told Murray 
"that the War Department is not going to contract with a loosely organized combi­
nation of that kind unless it could be established that they had competent and 
responsible management."16 Murray thought immediately of the Anaconda Copper 
Mining Company. It would be "capable of undertaking the organization of these 
plants in Montana, and competent to direct the operations of such plants in the 
manufacturing of some articles of war or parts which could be turned out on a 
large scale."17 Murray then suggested to Towel that if "Montana, Inc. could 
secure the aid of the A.C.M. contracts could be easily negotiated."18 This sugges­
tion proved impossible to attain. The top one hundred corporations in America 
manipulated "75 percent of all the war contracts issued by the federal 
government,"19 or 75 percent of the 40 billion dollars the federal government 
injected into the west between 1940 and 1945.20 The A.C.M., ranked 58 in the 
top one hundred corporations securing defense contracts, and had all it could 
handle with these, let alone try and secure contracts for Montana's small manufac­
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turers.21 By October of 1942 the A.C.M. had acquired over 52 percent of the 
interest in the largest magnesium plant in America.22 By 1943, this plant produced 
39 percent of all the magnesium in the United States.23 A.C.M. assistance was 
totally out of the question. Montana's plants would remain nominal during the war. 
In March of 1942, Senator Murray and Representative Wright Patman of 
Texas drafted legislation creating the Small War Plant Corporation. The Murray-
Patman Act of 1942, passed with little difficulty, distributed $150 million in war 
contracts to America's small businesses.24 The act proved beneficial to plants 
throughout the United States, but had little effect in Montana. In August of 1944, 
the Cascade Mills of Great Falls applied for a loan from the Small War Plants 
Corporation. This loan was rejected on the bases of insufficient information.25 
The rejection further reinforced the unorganized nature of Montana's manufac­
tures. Not until late in November of 1944 did Montana benefit from the Small War 
Plant corporation. 
On November 27, 1944, Roy R. Johnston of Columbia Falls, a lumber mill 
owner, wrote Murray to complain that the big companies he had been selling his 
green lumber to had stopped buying. Because of this he was unable to make his 
pay roll. If the federal government would not help, he and several other mills 
would go bankrupt. Murray contacted Maury Maverick, the head of the Small War 
Plant Corporation to see if he could help. Maverick responded positively. He made 
the necessary arrangements for the government procurement office to contract for 
the lumber.26 But this action was too little, too late to diversify Montana's 
economy. 
Montana's role in the initial mobilization plan was as a producer of raw 
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materials, primarily agricultural products. This made sense when over 30 percent, 
and at times almost 40 percent of the state's gross domestic product came in agri­
cultural production (see Chart A, Appendix A). Then, after Lend-Lease, the 
president turned toward industry which again excludes Montana. In the west, 
industry was primarily concentrated on the coast, in California, Oregon, and 
Washington. The industrial giants involved in the joint corporation known as the 
Big Six received the first big war contracts.27 These companies played a deciding 
role in the manipulation of war contracts during the war. When the War Depart­
ment looked to the west for possible sites for scientific laboratories, Montana, 
because of its geographical position and its unreliable climate, was out of conten­
tion.28 Montana would have to rely on agriculture for its survival. Montana was 
too unorganized to benefit from the large sums of money being injected into the 
west, and it lacked the proper infrastructure to support heavy industry. 
This new government aid would require the Federal Government to invest 
$1.25 billion into the west, primarily on the west coast, for the construction of 
aircraft and ship building facilities in Washington and California.29 These new 
war-related industries tempted Montana wage workers with high-paying jobs out­
side the state. Wartime jobs ended the depression psychology that had gripped 
Montana for nearly two decades. Another incentive was the selective service. In 
1941, more than 12,000 Montanans answered the call for military service and 
defense plant jobs, reducing the population of Montana to 544,000 people (see 
Table 28, Appendix A), and the available labor force to 208,000 (see Table 14, 
Appendix A). A 17,000 person deficit is a heavy blow to a state reliant on a large 
pool of labor. During the First World War, Montana contributed more participants 
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per capita then any state in the union.30 Over 35 percent of the labor force was 
between the ages of 18 and 34.31 Events outside of Montana hamstrung Montana's 
production capacity. 
Montana farmers went into their fields to sow their crops in the spring of 
1941. Spring work on a farm in Montana demanded two hired hands; and in some 
cases more.32 In the spring of 1941 hiring proved to be very difficult. The tradi­
tional supply of Mexican-American labor from California and Texas had all but 
dried up.33 Labor intensive crops like sugar beets suffered. The American Crystal 
Sugar Company in Missoula went to the Stanten Labor Company in Spokane to 
acquire the needed labor. (American Crystal Sugar Company had used the service 
of Stanten in years past). This time Stanten could not oblige. It had no available 
labor to spare. American Crystal tried skid row in Spokane, less than 
successfully.34 The company returned to Missoula and cruised the Northern Pacif­
ic hobo jungle to recruit anyone who looked like he could do a day's work. The 
company's field supervisor, Arthur Deschamps, did this every day through spring 
planting and summer hoeing.35 The labor secured though this process proved 
inexperienced. Nevertheless, Deschamps managed to get the sugar beets in the 
ground. In the fall, the lack of labor continued to be troublesome. Usually young 
men and boys would arrive from Iowa, Nebraska, and Kansas to help take off the 
crops. In the fall of 1941 they did not come.36 Selective Service and better paying 
jobs in defense plants on the coast sucked off the traditional labor force. Homer 
Bowker of the American Crystal Sugar Company had "to travel over 200 miles in 
the Bitterroot to find hands for the company's loading station."37 Sugar beet 
acreage in 1941 was down 19,000 acres. The harvest dropped to 793,000 tons, a 
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reduction of 373,000 tons. Revenues generated by sugar beets dropped over 
$400,000 (see Table 21, Appendix A). The labor shortage also affected the potato 
crop of 1941. One thousand fewer acres were put to seed, which cut the bushels 
harvested by 185,000 from 1940 (see Table 29, Appendix A). The commodities 
market saved the potato crop from the tough times that hit the sugar beets. The 
price of potatoes had been on the rise in correlation to events in Europe. This rise 
in prices helped potato farmers in Montana to reap a $406,000 profit over 1940 
(see Table 29, Appendix A). 
Labor shortages appear not to have affected other commodities in Montana. 
Statistics for other commodities show the opposite results of the sugar beet and 
potato crops. Montana grain farmers increased production in wheat by over 16,000 
bushels, with a value of $59,000. Incredibly, this increase was achieved with 
slightly over 200 fewer acres (see Table 22, Appendix A). 
On October 5, 1941, Montana farmers were told by their local U.S.D.A. 
official that they would be expected to increase their production next year. The 
A. A. A. would relax its restriction on production, and commodity prices would 
not drop below 85 percent of parity.38 This news weighed heavy on the mind of 
the Montana farmer when he thought about all the difficulties he had encountered 
in getting this year's crop sown and harvested. Nevertheless, the farmer could look 
back on the production of 1941 and smile. The prices he received pushed his 
annual income up to $3,730, a thousand dollar increase over 1940 (see Table 3, 
Appendix A). Overall, Montana agriculture generated over $140 million in 1941, 
the largest amount in a decade. 
Early war mobilization in 1941 put constraints on Montana's mining indus­
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try by depleting its much needed labor supply. The labor shortage was further 
exacerbated by new Government regulations on the manufacturing of new mining 
equipment. These newly implemented regulations had a direct effect on Montana's 
gold mining industry, which produced over 5 percent of the nation's gold in 1941, 
placing Montana eighth among gold producing states (see Table 30, Appendix A). 
The gold industry in Montana had generated on average over $8 million a year in 
the last four years (see Table 30, Appendix A). 
In May of 1941, the Office of Production Management began to look at the 
competition between gold mining industries and baser metal mining industries for 
mining equipment. Gold mining was not a crucial element to the governments 
preparation for a potential war. On July 29, 1941, the O.P.M. issued Preference 
Rating Order P-23.39 This order assigned "an A-3 rating for the deliveries of 
material needed in the production of mining equipment. ,,4° This selective order 
applied only to a special list of qualified mine machinery manufacturers. Because 
of the similarity in mining machinery used when mining underground, P-23 proved 
to be ineffective at stopping the flow of mining machinery to gold mining opera­
tions. "It was discovered that gold mines were receiving a small percent of new 
mining equipment; but the use in gold mines of maintenance and repair equipment 
was considerably larger."41 Preference Rating Order P-23 affected Montana's 
gold miners only slightly, but it enlightened the mining industry in Montana to the 
possibilities of future restricting orders. 
In September of 1941, the O.P.M. began discussing order P-56. This order 
excluded gold mines from Priority Rating for maintenance repair equipment. 
Under this order each mine obtained a classification as "important from the stand­
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point of defense or essential civilian needs. "42 P-56 discriminated against gold 
miners, but Congress passed the order on December 31, 1941.43 Clearly, the 
Federal Government planned even more encroachments on Montana mining. 
In spite of the new regulations the mining industry showed a slight increase 
in production in 1941. The annual income for mining in Montana was slightly over 
$86.5 million. The mining revenue generated in 1941 is a mere 4 percent greater 
than revenue generated in 1940, indicating that the new government encroachments 
into mining had curtailed advancements made under the 1939 Strategic Minerals 
Act (see Table 4, Appendix A). Nevertheless, the mining industry in Montana had 
taken substantial steps in mining such strategic minerals as zinc and manganese 
(see Table 24 and Table 31, Appendix A), despite the ever-dwindling labor supply. 
The success of Montana's primary industries was reflected in the per capita 
income received by Montana's wage workers. In 1941, Montana's workers in­
creased their earnings by almost $100 over 1940. The Montana worker was now 
taking home on average $670 a year, two times what he took home in 1932 (see 
Table 18, Appendix A). Unemployment also declined in 1941. In June of that year 
Montana had a little over 11,000 unemployed men, down nearly 14,000 men from 
1940. In December of 1941 there were only 9,000 unemployed men (see Table 16, 
Appendix A). This great decrease can be attributed to the Selective Service's induc­
tion of Montana's young men and the growth of America's war industry. 
In 1941 Montana's primary industry made more money then it had in the 
past several years. Folks who were working in this industry had more money to 
spend. This is illustrated in the rise of retail sales in the state. In 1941, Montanans 
spent over $12 million in their local retail stores, an increase of over $800,000 
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from 1940 (see Table 6, Appendix A). Business was so good that two hundred and 
seventy new businesses started up in 1941. The number of Montana companies hit 
a record 9,899. The business environment in Montana had not been this good since 
1930 when 9,643 businesses existed (see Table 5, Appendix A). Montana also 
improved and constructed 355 miles of road in the state, down just 98 miles from 
1940 (see Table 12, Appendix A). Tourist travel increased by 48,000 people in 
1941 (see Table 26, Appendix A). Over 1.7 million people came to Montana to 
take in its magnificent beauty. According to chief ranger George Miller, Glacier 
Park experienced its third-highest tourist season.44 Tourists in the state spent 
almost $30 million (see Table 26, Appendix A). 
1941 had been a relatively prosperous year for Montana. Although still 
very reliant on the federal aid it received, the state was almost in a position to 
stand on its own. World affairs put a strain on the federal government which in 
turn affected its ability to hand out much needed aid. But these world events had a 
positive effect on Montana's primary industry, agriculture. The war in Europe 
pushed up the prices that Montanans were getting for their commodities. This help 
make up the difference in the decline of federal aid. 
Beginning in 1941, the federal government began to wean Montanans from 
the federal bottle. The state had its federal aid cut by $14.6 million, to $37 mil­
lion, slightly above the aid it received in 1934 (see Table 9, Appendix A). The 
federal government was running short of funds. In the fall of 1941, Montanans 
read in their local newspapers that the federal government would cut back funds for 
the C.C.C. program in the west by 50 percent.45 During the depression years, the 
C.C.C. employed numerous Montanans. Nevertheless, monetary needs of war 
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mobilization required that cuts be made. The programs of the depression were at 
the top of the list. Newly-emerging war industries replaced these old programs to 
employ American and Montana workers. With or without these programs Montana 
was moving toward self-sufficiency, due in part to good weather conditions. The 
future though, was not totally clear of obstacles. The ever-growing war in Europe 
threatened to push America into another full scale conflict for the rights of democ­
racy. 
In the winter of 1941 Montanans listened to Edward R. Murrow from 
Europe, and read about the Japanese Empire's planned retaliation for the American 
embargo of scrap steel and iron. The embargo had been placed on Japan late in 
1940, in response to its aggressions in the Pacific.46 The reality of these events 
was brought home to Montana and America on Sunday morning, December 7, 
1941. Japan had attacked the American navel base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. 
America and Montana had been catapulted into war. 
CHAPTER 5 
World War Two 
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor caught America off guard. America 
lacked proper preparation in both domestic and industrial policies. President 
Roosevelt quickly changed his image. "Old Dr. New Deal" had left, he said, but 
"Dr. Win the War" had the solution for victory: "We're going to fight it with 
every thing we've got." 1 This meant spending billions in the west to develop a 
bigger and better war machine. The new commitment by the government to beef 
up its western war industries constituted a tremendous setback for the state of 
Montana. Montana had already suffered the effects of early war mobilization in 
1941 when 12,000 people left to find better employment opportunities in defense 
plants on the west coast. Now that America had declared war on the Axis Powers, 
the newly created defense jobs, coupled with the drain on manpower by the selec­
tive service, put an even greater strain on Montana's already dwindling labor 
supply. In 1942, the war would entice 22,000 Montanans to leave the state (see 
Table 28, Appendix A). With this massive drain on labor also came new govern­
ment intrusions into the daily lives of Montanans. 
The coming of the war placed tremendous pressure and difficulties on 
Montana's farmers to secure sufficient labor for farm work. Without sufficient 
labor, the farmers would have a very difficult time in getting their crops sown in 
the spring and harvested in the fall. Starting in the early spring of 1942, Montana's 
Governor Sam Ford inquired into the possibility of using the Japanese detainees in 
California to work in the agricultural fields of Montana.2 Governor Ford had 
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received word that the immigration office in Washington, D. C., was going to 
loosen restriction on the detainees.3 In May Governor Ford telegrammed Senator 
Murray to inquire into the possibilities of using Mexican labor. Murray said 
Mexicans were available but farmers were responsible for transportation costs to 
and from California.4 The government had helped California and Texas bring in 
migrant labor by paying the cost of transportation after the first two hundred miles, 
which the states would have to pay.5 This hurt Montana because of the great dis­
tances involved. Montana farmers were left with the choice of paying all transpor­
tation costs or having no labor. (Montana farmers were also to incur the cost of 
transportation of Japanese labor.) 
The cost of transporting this labor proved to be expensive for the Montana 
farmer. Labor would be transported on public transportation systems. If the 
Montana beet farmer agreed to pay the bill the cost would be approximately $100 
per man for Mexican labor. Sugar beet farmers would be spending an additional 
$10 per acre on top of the usual $14 per acre in spring planting costs.6 These 
prohibitively high costs meant that the 1,500 Mexicans needed to work the beet 
fields would not be available. 7 
G.N. Wells, president of the Montana-Dakota Beet Grower Association, 
said that the expensive costs for Mexican labor also held true for Japanese detain­
ees. Wells further stressed the very real possibility that if Mexico got involved in 
the war, Mexican nationals would be removed from the labor force, further con­
stricting Montana's labor supply.8 An alternative to this expensive labor needed to 
be found. Farm labor costs by 1942 had already risen 41 percent over 1940. 9 
Wells wrote Senator Murray in the spring of 1942 with an alternative to 
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public transportation. "The importation of Japanese is going to cost approximately 
60 dollars per head" he figured. Wells suggested a special rate to transport Japa­
nese and Mexican labor from California on common carriers.10 Beet growers and 
interested farmers might charter buses to transport minority labor. They could cut 
the cost to $15 a person. Forty passenger school buses would make the trip. These 
buses would break no interstate transportation laws because they would not be 
charging any fares. The cost of the transportation would be picked up by the Beet 
Growers Association.11 P.B. Hurd of the American Legion Post No. 12 in 
Sidney, Montana supported this proposal. Mr. Hurd argued that with sufficient 
labor the Sidney area could out-produce the 1940 bumper year. The Legion post in 
Sidney would bear the cost of transporting and lodging Japanese labor.12 Hearing 
the request of Montana farmers to look at alternatives to the transportation of 
minority labor, Senator Murray contacted the proper authorities in Washington 
D.C. to see what could be done. 
On June 9, 1942, Murray put out a press release stating that Montana 
farmers and beet growers could use charter buses to transport labor from Califor­
nia. Those chartering buses would have to make their own arrangements with the 
states they passed through to determine whether they needed to pay the penalty 
license tax assessed other truckers and buses.13 These arrangements were made 
and the desperately-needed labor was bussed into Montana. 
The labor from the detainee camps in California came of its own free will. 
Farmers who used this labor had to house and feed the workers. They were also 
obliged to pay them the same wages they would pay any other normal type of 
labor. In the case of Japanese laborers, farmers were also responsible for building 
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them a special bathtub for taking extremely hot baths.14 Japanese labor worked 
well in Montana for the most part, but there were some registered complaints. 
J.Russell Larcombe of Malta complained that the Japanese were "refusing to live 
up to their contract." Mr. Larcombe explained that the Japanese were"demanding 
an hourly rate for the thinning, because the beets were so large by the time they 
arrived ,that it was hard for a green hand to make a satisfactory wage." Mr. 
Larcombe went on to say that he had already lost a third of his crop and if "help is 
not guaranteed, eight out of ten growers will not plant again."15 The experience of 
Mr. Larcombe, however, was not the norm. In fact , Arthur Deschamps, field 
supervisor for the American Crystal Sugar Co., said the company had no real 
problems with its Japanese labor. The Overall inexperience of the laborers posed 
the most taxing problem experienced by all farmers in 1942. Sugar companies in 
western Montana started the sugar beet harvest a week early in order to familiarize 
field hands with the back breaking job.16 
Even with the influx of Japanese and Mexican workers, Montana farmers 
found themselves short on labor and long on work. In the fall of 1942 Governor 
Ford telegrammed the President of the United States asking him to send army 
troops to help harvest Montana's sugar beet crop. Governor Ford's request for one 
or two thousands solders was denied.17 It took the volunteer service of 2,500 
volunteers from Montana's schools, stores and factories to take the sugar beet crop 
of 1942 out of the fields. 18 In fact, in northeast Montana, Canadian and Montana 
farmers exchanged workers and machinery to ensure maximum wartime crop 
production in the harvesting of wheat.19 
The labor situation in Montana was desperate at best. Forty-nine year old 
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Ormond Blood of Hamilton took his own life. Family members said he was becom­
ing despondent because of all the farm work he had to do by himself.20 In Billings 
Governor Ford temporarily set aside a 90-day jail sentence for John Kline, convict­
ed of a third degree assault charge, so Kline, a Bighorn County sugar beet grower, 
could complete his harvest.21 
In August of 1942, Senator Murray expressed his dissatisfaction with the 
United States Employment Agency for its handling of the labor shortage in Monta­
na. The Agency told Murray there was no labor shortage. The farm labor place­
ment section of the agency said there were 21,000 farm laborers working the hay 
fields. When these laborers were done in the hay field they could go to work in the 
beet fields. Murray said "they wouldn't because of the type of work and the low 
wages."22 Moreover, these 21,000 hay laborers were spread throughout the state, 
making it impossible for them to get to the beet fields in time for harvest. Never­
theless Montana farmers somehow completed the harvest in the fall of 1942, and 
were reimbursed greatly with a higher annual income. 
In 1942, the Montana farmer's cash income increased by a thousand dollars 
over 1941 to $3,730 (see Table 3, Appendix A). Overall, agriculture in Montana 
netted a profit of well over $180 million, up over $40 million from 1941 (see 
Table 2, Appendix A). Sugar beet farmer acreage increased by ten thousand acres, 
now that sugar beets were a strategic crop vital to the war effort. Acreage in flax 
seed, barley and corn also rose, but acreage in wheat fell (see Tables 21, 32, 33, 
34 and 2, Appendix A). The acreage decrease in wheat was caused by the increase 
in acreage of such strategic crops as flax seed. Even with the decrease in wheat 
acreage, Montana grain growers harvested over 5,000 more bushels of wheat in 
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1942 compared to 1941 (see Table 22, Appendix A). Wheat production in 1942 
produced more bushels of wheat then farmers could store. To alleviate this prob­
lem the A.A.A. built fifty-six grain bins in the Great Falls area. These bins had a 
holding capacity of 168,000 bushels of grain.(23) Montana grain farmers received 
further assistance when the United States government, along with other allied 
nations, formed a mammoth wheat pool. The United States' share hit 50 million 
bushels.24 This new government program allowed for the absorption of America's 
wheat surplus, and further insured the Montana wheat farmer of a buyer for his 
commodity. Here again the overall needs of the country demanded that the federal 
government step in with federally-funded agricultural programs to insure maximum 
production. On the other hand, the effects of this form of production enhancement 
began to draw great attention from the federal government, which was quite con­
cerned about the high prices farmers were receiving. By the summer of 1942 the 
average American wage earner was spending over 28 percent of his earned income 
on food.25 Inflation was on the rise and most people outside the farm belt thought 
that high commodity prices were to blame. 
In the first nine months of 1942, farm prices had risen by 31 percent. By 
September of 1942 the price for farm commodities stood at 107 percent of 
parity.26 Even with this increase, farm prices still fell short of the 41 percent 
increase in farm labor wages brought about by the war. The farm block in Con­
gress argued for 110 percent of parity in order to compete for labor with defense 
plants. 
To illustrate this point P.T. Bennet of Garland, Montana, worked 1,800 
acres of land while tending his herds of sheep and cattle. Mr. Bennet had good 
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husbandry skills and worked anywhere between 80 and 110 hours a week without 
any of the overtime pay that defense workers enjoyed.27 Ronald Larsen put it best 
when he said that "competent farmers can be kept on the farm only by giving them 
the things that everyone else takes for granted."28 Farmers like Bennet and 
Larsen needed this increase in parity to hire labor and buy labor-saving machinery 
for extensive farm work. Unfortunately, the President disagreed. 
President Roosevelt perpetuated the idea that the farmer is to blame for the 
ensuing inflation. In the fall of 1942, President Roosevelt ordered Congress to put 
a ceiling on commodity prices.29 If Congress resisted, the President threatened to 
use his executive powers to do it himself.30 Farm belt congressmen rallied to this 
challenge. Congress proposed to set agricultural prices at the highest price 
commodities reached between January and September of 1942, but not below the 
traditional parity price. Congressmen also included the cost of farm labor in this 
price.31 In late September Representative Stengal of Alabama introduced the new 
farm bill.32 The President rejected it on September 30, 1942. President Roosevelt 
sent the congressmen back to chambers to come up with a bill that fell more in line 
with what he thought was best-commodity prices set at 100 percent of parity.33 
Montana farmers would have to wait until the spring of 1943 for the president and 
congress to come up with a solution to the farm price debate. 
In April of 1942 Senator Bankhead, a Democrat from Alabama, proposed a 
bill to curb inflation and at the same time raise parity prices for farmers to 110 
percent. President Roosevelt vetoed this bill on the grounds that he was protecting 
the American public against inflation. The AFL-CIO and other organized labor 
groups backed F.D.R. solidly on this veto.34 Montana's Senator Burton K. 
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Wheeler, speaking on behalf of the vetoed Bankhead proposal, referred to an 
advertisement he had come across in the Miles City newspaper. In this advertise­
ment Montana men were offered $250 a month and a draft deferment to come to 
Seattle to work. Wheeler asked "where in the United States could a farmer or 
rancher offer 250 dollars a month for labor. "35 Wheeler stood firmly behind the 
vetoed Bankhead proposal. Regardless, President Roosevelt responded to the ina­
bility of Congress to come up with a reasonable commodity price by freezing all 
commodity prices on April 9 1943.36 Ironically, by the time President Roosevelt 
put on the freeze, commodities had risen to the recommended level of 110 
percent.37 The parity price dispute had inadvertently been resolved. Unfortunately 
the question of how to stabilize the ever-growing labor shortage had not. 
In September of 1942, the federal government tried to alleviate the problem 
of the labor shortage by issuing a worker freeze. Under this worker freeze no one 
could be hired without a certificate of separation from the United State Employ­
ment Service.38 The intended objective behind this freeze was to prevent valuable 
labor from leaving defense jobs to take a different job offering better pay. The 
freeze had little effect in Montana. A.C. Stewart of Billings tells of a postal worker 
who left his job which paid $185 a month for another job at higher wages. Stewart 
noted that the postal worker had taken a job at the Hunt Mountain project near 
Cody Wyoming. There the ex-postal worker's first week's pay check totaled 
$140.39 
Another example of the ineffectiveness of the government's worker freeze 
involved Leonard Cook of Phillipsburg. Cook had been working at the smelter in 
Anaconda when a position opened up for a truck driver with the Union Construe-
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tion Co. in Great Falls. Leonard said the money he would make driving truck was 
much better then what he was making in the smelter. Leonard told his foreman at 
the smelter that he was leaving to take a job in construction. The foreman told 
Leonard that he could not quit his job because he was frozen. Leonard said quite 
bluntly " that's funny, I don't feel a chill," and left for the better paying construc­
tion job.40 The government's worker freeze did not stop many Montanans from 
pursuing and securing better-paying jobs. 
By the end of September, a partial solution had been found for the farm 
labor problem. Farmers could now obtain deferments for some of their farm hands. 
Each case had to be looked at separately, and the process was very time-consum­
ing. In the end the deferments were usually given to a key man on the farm.41 Not 
only did the war intensify the labor problem in Montana it also brought intrusive 
government policies that would further hamstring Montana's effort to get the job 
done. 
The war required Montanans and Americans to deal with limitations on 
certain commodities as well as the rationing of many items. One of the more debil­
itating and bureaucracy- laced rations was on gasoline. In 1940, Montana produced 
enough gasoline so that every car and truck registered in the state could receive 
650 gallons a year. Production in 1941 exceeded Montana's personal consumption 
(see Table 35, Appendix A). This statistic allows one to understand why Monta­
nans found it hard to accept, let alone comprehend, why they needed gas rationing 
during the war. 
Montana's Governor Sam Ford took steps to cut gas consumption early in 
July of 1942. Starting in July Montanans would have to reduce their speeds on 
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highways to 40 miles an hour.42 By September of 1942, gas rationing had already 
been incorporated on the east coast, at a speed limit of 35 miles an hour, and a 
driving distance of 2,800 miles per year. The average citizen would receive a mere 
four gallons a week.44 This went over in Montana about as well as a lead Zeppe­
lin. J.W. Peckham, secretary-manager of the Montana Transportation Association, 
protested the speed limit on behalf of Montana truckers. Peckham claimed the 35 
mph speed limit would entail many costly changes in equipment. Peckham noted 
that trucks were designed to operate at 46 mph in direct gear and 55 mph in over­
drive.45 Almost every commodity produced in Montana had to be trucked to 
market. The great distances, coupled with limited gas, would choke Montana's 
ability to produce. The problem gained further credence from A1 Winkler, the 
chairman of the Montana Highway Commission. Winkler noted that the 35 mph 
speed limit and the gas ration would cut Montana's highway revenue by 65 per­
cent. (Montana's highway revenue for new construction and repairs was based 
solely on a gas tax.)46 Moreover, Montana farmers were heavily reliant on gaso­
line for the operations of their farms. 
John R. Richards, Chief of the Gasoline Rationing Branch of the Office of 
Price Administration, put the farmers fears to rest in November of 1942. He told 
farmers that they would receive both an A and a B book of gasoline rations which 
would give them 560 miles worth of gas a week.47 Richards further told farmers 
that tractors would be classified as "war necessary1', allowing farmers to get as 
much gas as they needed to run their farms and get their commodities to market.48 
This seemingly reasonable policy did not work in practice. 
J. C. Golick of Joplin, Montana, participated in the program for trucks classified 
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as "war necessary". His tabulation showed that he traveled 9,000 miles a year with 
one truck. Mr. Gulick noted that his farm operation required the work of two 
trucks, but he used only one out of patriotic duty. The Commission allowed him 
3,100 miles for 1943 which equals 349 gallons of gas. Gulick stated, "that this is 
an outrage and means involuntary bankruptcy, no chance for agriculture whatsoev­
er." Gulick further illustrated that he put 30,000 miles a year on his car which he 
used for farm business. Gulick also stated that in some years "I only have to go 
over my summer fallow three times, but sometimes as much as six." "It's no use 
seeding unless the seeds are summer tilled. That is the scientific bases of western 
farming."49 Curt Nelson, owner of Nelson Furniture Co. in Havre, had similar 
problems with his certificate of "war necessary". Nelson operated a three-quarter-
ton federal truck. His certificate allowed him eight gallons a month for the first six 
months and ten gallons a month for the last six months. Nelson states that the 
amount for one month "is not sufficient to fill my tank once."50 Results like these 
were not uncommon in Montana. Due to the negative results and the complicated 
forms Montana farmers and businessmen had to fill out, they eventually began to 
give extremely high figures to the gas ration board just to insure that they would 
have enough gas to get the job done.51 The overall effect of gas rationing for 
Montanans was one of constriction and frustration. The government was directing 
Montanans' livelihood through their gas tanks. Nevertheless gas rationing was here 
for the duration of the war. Montanans would quickly overcome and adapt to this 
new government restriction, and do the same for the ones yet to come. 
In the fall of 1942, with the demand for steel in booming war industries on 
the rise, Secretary of Agriculture Wickard ordered the rationing of farm machinery 
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and a temporary freeze on the production of new farm machinery.52 Secretary 
Wickard in October removed the farm machinery freeze for thirty days to allow 
farmers to go to their ration boards and fill out one of three forms for the distribu­
tion of farm machinery.53 On October 20th, while Montana farmers were filling 
out the form, the W.P.B. issued Limitation Order L-170. This order severely 
curtailed the production of farm machinery.54 Later that fall Montana farmers 
were urged by Montana State College engineers to take care of their farm machin­
ery because under order L-170 the 1943 production of new farm machinery would 
be reduced to 20 percent of the 1941 production level.55 Another obstacle to 
production had been thrown up to farmers. All that remained for farmers to do in 
the winter of 1942-43 was to read the newspaper and listen to the radio. 
In October of 1942, farmers and all citizens of Montana were hit with a 
record-breaking tax bill. The new tax imposed a 19 percent levy on the first taxa­
ble dollars of every citizen plus a 5 percent "victory tax" on every dollar over $624 
annually. This new tax became effective January 1, 1943, and applied to 1942 
earnings.56 This tax would be automatically taken out by employers and the 
government would refund a portion of the tax after the war.57 ^see Append** B) 
This tax hit Montanans hard in the pocket book. Now the positive steps 
made by farmers and wage earners were stifled in order to generate revenue for the 
war effort. The effects of this new federal tax are reflected in the total amount of 
federal tax collected in Montana from 1942 earnings: an amazing $10.9 million, 
up over $6 million from 1941 (see Table 8, Appendix A). A figure like this indi­
cates that Montana farmers and wage workers were giving over 20 percent of their 
earned income back to the United States government to finance the war. 
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In 1942, the mining industry also slowed down due to the same afflictions 
that had plagued agriculture. Labor had become an ever present problem for 
mining operations in Montana. The worker freeze had little effect in attracting and 
keeping workers in the strategic mines. After all, "making 19 dollars a shift in an 
aircraft aluminum factory generated more interest then 7 dollars 50 cents for risk­
ing your life in a mine. "58 Further aid did come to the mining industry when the 
War Production Board, which replaced the Office of Production Board in Febru­
ary, 1942, issued Limitation Order 208. 
The Limitation Order, issued in October 1942, closed down gold mines for 
the duration of the war. "This order passed without prior circulation or without 
reference to the clearance committee": that same day the War Manpower Commis­
sion passed Directive no. 13.59 In this directive employers were ordered not to 
hire anyone in connection with gold mines unless by referral from the United 
States Employment Service. This directive also suggested that the U.S.E.S. "refer 
gold mine workers to other essential nonferrous metal mines.1,60 Non-gold mines 
in Montana were still short on labor and long on work to be done. In fact, in the 
fall of 1942, the U.S.E.S. went searching throughout Minnesota to find 1,300 
skilled workers to come and work in the copper mines of Montana. The U.S.E.S. 
baited these potential workers with the monetary figure of $6.75 a day, six days a 
week, with time and a half for over time.61 The struggle to secure sufficient labor 
went on. 
Despite the lack of labor the mining industry managed to surpass its 1941 
annual income of $86.5 million. In 1942 the industry scraped up $96.6 million in 
revenue (see Table 4, Appendix A). The year had been stressful and demanding, 
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but mining came through with a profit. Unfortunately though, 1943 did not look 
promising. 
Nineteen-forty-two had been a tremendously taxing year for Montana. The 
nation had once again gone to war in far off lands. Great expectations were piled 
on Montana to do its part to expedite an American victory. Montana farmers and 
miners were continually asked to produce more with less labor. This put undue 
stress on Montana producers. The pressure to produce and the inability to do so 
became a pervasive element behind the forces driving Montanans to leave and find 
work elsewhere in the defense industry. 
In December of 1942, John J. Jewell, a member of the Montana Automo­
bile Dealers Association, took a drive around Montana and visited twenty-one 
counties. Jewell's adventure started in Great Falls. From there he drove to Cut-
bank, then east to Culbertson, south to Glendive and Billings, and back to Great 
Falls via Roundup. Along his entire journey, at every stop, Jewell found an inordi­
nate amount of sale bills for farms that were being sold because of the lack of 
available labor. Jewell further noted that the classification of "war necessary" for 
farm implements was not working.62 The war had taken its toll on the dryland 
farmers of Montana. 
By the end of 1942, 34,000 Montanans had packed up their bags and moved 
on to better opportunities in booming defense industries on the west coast. Some of 
these folks answered the ad that Senator Wheeler complained about, and a large 
number of young men had joined the military. The armed services had increased 
pay for enlisted men in the summer of 1942. Now a buck private received $50 a 
month plus room and board.63 For a young man seeking adventure, which all 
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young men do, this was an opportunity not to pass up. The Navy needed construc­
tion workers for the Sea Bees.64 Further, an editorial in the Missoulian of July 5, 
1942, told of a Missoula girl who was making ten dollars a shift as a welder in a 
Seattle war plant. What further incentive would a young Montanan need? 
CHAPTER 6 
The War's Effect on Domestic Affairs 
By 1943 the United States had been involved in the world war for a little 
over a year. In that time the Government had learned some hard lessons about 
effective administration of the home front. The Government had established some 
definite policies to effectively plan, implement and monitor the ultimate weapon in 
modern warfare, the American manufacturing machine. 
By far the most debilitating effects of the war for Montana came in the 
absorption of the labor force and Limitation Order-170 which curtailed the manu­
facturing of farm machinery. These two drawbacks received great attention in the 
winter of 1942-43. 
Montana began 1943 with 184,000 people in its labor force, only a slight 
decline, of 2,000 people, from 1942 (see Table 14, Appendix A). Further, Monta­
na had only 970 registered unemployed persons, down by almost 7,000 from 1942 
(see Table 16, Appendix A). Montana desperately needed either laborers or farm 
machinery to reduce the burden of an insufficient labor supply. In the first part of 
April, 1943, President Roosevelt ordered Paul McNutt, head of the War Manpow­
er Commission, to prohibit anyone from taking a new job for higher wages unless 
the change in jobs would benefit the war effort. Roosevelt insisted that if a change 
in jobs should occur the new wages received must follow the "little steel" formula 
of the War Labor Board. The "little steel" formula authorized a 15 percent increase 
in wages over the level of wages as of January 1, 1941.1 By following the "little 
steel" formula, the worker would supposedly be compensated for the increases in 
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the cost of living that have developed since the war started.2 
On April 17, 1943, McNutt ordered a job wage freeze. Under the freeze no 
one could leave one essential job for another which paid higher wages. Deviation 
from this order would result in a $1,000 fine for the employer,and a possible year 
in jail.3 If an employee had been fired from his defense job he could find another 
job, but not at a higher wage.4 Confronted with the question of a man's having the 
chance to better himself, McNutt replied with one sentence: "We got a war going 
on."5 The Government had now gotten tough on the issue of supplying sufficient 
labor to the war industry to enable it to continue its record breaking production. 
The Government also took positive steps toward resolving the perplexing problem 
of farm labor. 
In the fall and winter of 1942-43, the United States worked diligently with 
Mexico to establish a policy enabling Mexican labor to come to the United States 
to work on American farms. In late April of 1943 the two governments reached a 
workable solution. Mexico agreed to send thousands of migrant labors to America 
to help out the American farmer.6 (see Appendix C). 
To further assist the new "braceros" project, the United States Congress 
passed Public Law 45 which provided funds to secure sufficient labor for American 
farmers. Under this law the congress "appropriated, the sum of $26,100,000, to 
remain available until December 31, 1943."7 Another government program 
promised to rescue the farmers of Montana from the dire straits of their labor situa­
tion. 
On the issue of making farm machinery more available, Senator Harry 
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Truman of Missouri proposed to increase the production level of farm machinery 
from 20 percent of the base period 1940 (or 1941, which ever was higher), to 50 
percent.8* This bill attracted strong support from Montana farmers. Many farmers 
and implement dealers wrote Senator Murray and urged him to support this bill 
wholeheartedly.9 The State Legislature of Montana also got behind this issue. 
In February of 1943 Sam W. Mitchel, Secretary of State for the state house 
of Montana, and C.J. McAllister, Secretary of the Senate, sent two memorials to 
their representatives in Washington, D.C.. Memorial 1 dealt with the increase of 
farm machinery to relieve the farm labor shortage. Memorial 2 asked for a greater 
allowance for farm machinery and the deferment of farm hands for food produc­
tion.10 Meanwhile Montana farmers and ranchers would have to do the best they 
could. In the end the results were less than satisfactory. 
R.J Mckenna, the chairman of the Montana U.S.D.A., complained about 
the disgusting farm machine situation in Montana. Mckenna allotted ten tractors to 
a particular county on paper, but he did not have the tractors to allocate. He re­
ceived six-and seven-foot harrows, three-and four-foot one-way plows, and light 
buck rakes. All of these implements were designed for farming in the east. Mcken­
na also pointed to a lack of experienced administrators to distribute the rationed 
farm machinery. 11 A similar complaint came from Paul Seibert, the chairman of 
the Phillips County U.S.D.A. 
Seibert wrote Senator Murray in the early summer of 1943 to complain 
about the lack of potato diggers to harvest the 750 acres of potatoes planted in the 
county. Seibert explained that 750 acres was three to four times the amount usually 
planted, but only six potato diggers were available. Without additional labor it 
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would be impossible to harvest the potatoes. The county is in "urgent need of at 
least eight additional diggers," Seibert stressed, and if these diggers are not pro­
cured "a considerable amount of the 1943 potato crop will not be harvested."12 
Murray contacted L.L.Needier of the Farm Machinery and Supplies Division to 
see what could be done. Needier took two weeks to respond to the Phillips county 
digger dilemma: "we have delayed our reply while endeavoring to locate some 
potato diggers which we could allocate to your state in order to alleviate the situa­
tion." 13 Somehow Needier found five additional potato diggers, but the state and 
county U.S.D.A. War Boards had to request an increase in quotas. Needier expe­
dited the problem by sending the Phillips county U.S.D.A. War Board letter direct­
ly to the state U.S.D.A. War Board in Bozeman.14 This action cut some but not 
all the red tape. 
Farm machinery was extremely difficult to acquire; so were repair parts for 
farm machinery. Walt C. Nye of Billings complained strongly of the red tape 
necessary to obtain replacement parts for his implements.15 Otto J. House of 
Great Falls bitterly complained that prices had been fixed on commodities but not 
on repair parts. Mr. House explained that small farmers were being forced from 
their farms because they could not afford repair parts. This so upset Mr. House 
that he sent the repair bill for his plow to Senator Murray.16 
Pearl Belay described a downed tractor when she complained on behalf of 
Fergus county farmers who were disgusted by the delays they encountered when 
applying for replacement parts. Ms. Belay stated that "because of a two week delay 
in obtaining certain implement parts in the summer fallow season of 1942, 2,000 
bushels of wheat were lost in 1943.1,17 She cited a county record of one tractor's 
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output in 1942 and the potential loss if that tractor were out of commission because 
repair parts could not be obtained. The table below indicates commodity produc­
tion lost to a incapacitated tractor. 
Commodity Output 
Wheat 35,084 bu. 
Oats 5,000 bu. 
Barley 500 bu. 
Lambs 49,270 lbs. 
Wool 18,688 lbs. 
Hay 420 tons. 
These statistics could make or break a farmer if he did not have repair parts. 
John J. Jewell of the Montana Auto Dealers Association made a trip 
through western Montana and found the matter of farm machinery in dire straits, 
especially mowers for hay production. Jewell pointed out that the Army has twenty 
power mowers at its air bases in Great Falls and Lewistown. Jewell felt that mili­
tary needs required not more than four mowers. Jewell further calculated that if 
sufficient hay were not produced it would lead to a depletion of both beef and dairy 
stock in the state. Jewell reinforced this statement by noting that in Lake County, 
the largest dairy county in the state, if hay could not be cut, then milk could not be 
produced.18 
In the spring of 1943, Montana farmers were informed that men with farm 
experience would be deferred from the draft and placed in the 4-f class.19 This 
news was welcomed by Montana farmers wholeheartedly as they went into the field 
to do their spring work. Montana farmers received even more encouraging news 
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from J. P. Brennan of the U.S.E.S. in Helena. Brennan assured agricultural 
committees in Montana counties that they would have adequate labor for spring 
and fall work. Brennan then urged farmers to plant more acres to meet the rising 
war needs.2® On this point Montana farmers were a bit reserved; they approached 
spring planting with caution. More good news arrived for Montana's beet growers. 
The government would guarantee $12 a ton for their beets.21 With this informa­
tion Chester Davis of the Montana War Board asked farmers to sign up for the 
1943 Farm Plan and increase their production of sugar beets.22 The 1943 Farm 
Plan had penalties attached to it to insure the farmer planted the amount he signed 
up for. Under the Plan a farmer could be penalized as much as $15 an acre for 
each acre he did not put to seed.23 Knowing this, farmers were cautious and did 
not break any speed records signing up for the new program.24 Other incentives 
were offered to the farmer if he increased his 1942 acreage. This program targeted 
potato and truck farmers in Montana. Potato farmers could receive an increase of 
50 cents a bushel; truck farmers 50 cents an acre.25 
Beet farmers were further relieved in the spring of 1943 when wages were 
fixed. R. J. McKenna, the states A.A.A. chairman, estimated that the wage fix 
would save beet growers from $3 to $3.25 an acre.26 McKenna also relayed 
orders from Washington, D.C., to increase farm machinery quotas to ensure spring 
planting.27 
In May of 1943, Mexicans involved in the Braceros program began to 
arrive in the state. They were distributed to any farmer who agreed with the re­
quirements set down by the United States and Mexican Governments (see Appen­
dix C). Many Montana farmers signed up for the Braceros program this time, 
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because the government would pay the bill to ship Mexican labor up from Mexico. 
Language was a big barrier for Montana farmers to overcome in order to operate 
smoothly with Mexican labor. The Montana vocational division addressed this 
problem by setting up programs to teach the Mexican labor the basic rudiments of 
English.29 
With the development of workable policies for labor, the price freeze on 
wages, and other amenities implemented in 1943, farmers produced enough 
commodities to boost Montana's annual agriculture income to an unprecedented 
$226.5 million, an increase of almost $46 million over 1942 (see Table 2, Appen­
dix A). Personal income of Montana farmers hit $6,180, up more then $1,400 
from 1942 (see Table 3, Appendix A). Montana sugar beet farmers did not in­
crease their acreage. In fact they decreased acreage by 18,000 acres, but crop 
values fell only a little over $1.3 million (see Table 21, Appendix A). Beet farm­
ers were saved from sure disaster by the government's guarantee to buy their sugar 
beets for $12 a ton. Grain farmers did increase their acreage in wheat, but only by 
a mere 223 acres. This slight increase helped push the bushels harvested to over 
77,000, with a value of $97 thousand, up by over 3000 bushels and $21,000 in 
value over 1942 (see Table 22, Appendix A). The increase in bushels of wheat 
harvested can be attributed to a higher yielding strain of wheat.30 
The price increase for a bushel of potatoes offered by the government had 
strongly affected Montana potato growers. It pushed the numbers of acres of pota­
toes planted in Montana to 8,000 acres. This in turn increased the bushels harvest­
ed to over 2.6 million, almost a million bushels over 1942 (see Table 29, Appen­
dix A). The war and the increased demand for beef greatly stimulated Montana 
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ranchers. Ranchers increased the number of cattle by 139,000 animals over 1942. 
This increase catapulted the value of Montana's cattle to over $116 million, up 
over $33 million from 1942 (see Table 20, Appendix A). 
Things did not go as well for Montana's mining industry in 1943. The lack 
of labor severely curtailed production of copper and other strategic minerals such 
as zinc and manganese (see Tables 23, 24,and 31, Appendix A). The mining indus­
try's annual income dropped to $91.7 million, a decline of almost $5 million from 
1943. 
Tourism in Montana also came out a loser in 1943, due to gas rationing and 
the new 10 percent travel tax.31 Tourist expenditures in 1943 stood at a little over 
$8.9 million, down over $20 million from the record year of 1941 (see Table 26, 
Appendix A). Montana's highway system was also a big loser in 1943, again due 
to gas rationing which cut Montana's highway revenue by 65 percent. The lack of 
federal funds also had a hand in Montana's inability to build or repair its roads. 
Only five miles of major roads were improved or built and no improvements were 
made on Montana's secondary roads (see Table 12, Appendix A). 
In 1943, Montanans paid over $28 million in federal income taxes, up over 
$17 million from 1942 (see Table 8, Appendix A). What makes this statistic so 
incredible is that by 1943 Montana had lost 15.8 percent of its population. The 
greatest losses came in the eastern part of the state (see Table 13, Appendix A). 
The eastern counties were decimated by the developments of the war. Phil­
lips and Valley Counties lost 25.2 percent of their populations. Golden Valley lost 
28.8 percent and McCone County lost 32.5 percent.(see Table 13, Appendix A). 
The list goes on. Every county in eastern Montana lost a substantial amount of its 
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population. Counties in the west also suffered population loss. Lake County 
dropped 26.5 percent, Madison County lost 31.7 percent, and Missoula County 
lost 13.2 percent (see Table 13, Appendix A). The winds created by military 
conscription and rapid developments in war industries blew off a substantial 15.8 
percent of Montana's population by the winter of 1943 (see Table 13, Appendix 
A). 
By the winter of 1943-44, the federal government had assumed total control 
of the American economy and was directing its course for total victory. American 
farmers and manufactures furnished massive amounts of essential supplies. The 
burden of production was relieved somewhat for the farmer in late December, 
1943. Donald M. Nelson of the War Production Board let it be known that manu­
facturers of farm machinery would be allowed 100 percent of the materials they 
had requested for the following year's production.32 With respect to tractors, 
Nelson stated that "the recently accelerated landing craft program may cause cer­
tain interferences, because both programs use many of the same components, some 
of which are in very short supply."33 Offensive operations by the Allies might 
curtail the availability of tractors, but in fact, Nelson's predication of late 1943 
became a reality. 
In the early spring of 1944 the Allied powers began the development of 
Operation Overlord, the western attack on the European continent.34 A problem 
of great magnitude emerged early: insufficient supplies of war machinery. America 
had been concentrating its efforts in the South Pacific, committing a large propor­
tion of war production to that effort.35 To fight on two fronts, government sought 
to increase production. 
57 
To insure an adequate labor supply for the American farmer the United 
States government on January 6, 1944, signed an agreement with the Mexican 
government to continue the "Braceros" program.36 To expedite the program, 
Congress amended Public Law 45, appropriating $20 million to the Farm Labor 
Supply Act of 1944, and amended the Act to continue through December 31, 
1945.37 Trucks, tractors and farm implements were classified as "war necessary." 
In 1944 farmers no longer worried about adequate supplies of fuel. The experi­
ences of two years of gas rationing had taught farmers to request extremely high 
allocations.38 
In the spring of 1944, the predicted shortages of commodities brought on by 
greater military needs arrived. New war developments demanded that the military 
have greater amounts of gasoline. To accommodate this, request the government 
cut back on gas allotted to non-essential drivers.39 The new cutback angered many 
Montanans who did not have "essential driver" status. Mr. and Mrs. George M. 
Clarkson of Haver were one such couple. Mr. Clarkson wrote Senator Murray in 
the spring of 1944, angrily objecting to the cutback. Clarkson noted that there was 
no shortage of gas in Montana.4® In fact, he was absolutely correct. In 1944, 
Montana produced over 170 million gallons of gasoline, up over 13 million gallons 
over 1943 and almost 17 million gallons over 1940 (see Table 35, Appendix A) 
Nevertheless, Murray explained to Clarkson that "the demands for the armed 
services have increased."41 
By early March of 1944, Charles Marlenee of Scoby had not yet received 
word on his application for an International TD-9 tractor. Marlenee needed this 
tractor to do spring work on his 1,500 acre farm. He wrote Senator Murray to find 
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out what the hold-up was. Murray explained that "the armed services are taking 
the entire out-put of the manufacturers of heavy machinery and heavy 
equipment."42 Later it turned out that Marlenee's application had been received 
after the allotted amount for that particular tractor had been exhausted in his coun­
ty.43 Later that month Edward Sikorski of Willard wrote Murray through his 
attorney A1 Hansen. Sikorski was "stuck". He had 1,400 acres to plant, but no 
tractor to pull his drill. Sikorski noted that he had been trying for ' more than a 
year" to get a tractor, a D-4 Cat. No tractor, no spring work.44 Again, Murray 
explained that "85 percent of this type of equipment goes to the armed services"45 
Sikorski would have to find another way to get his spring work done. 
In 1944 25,000 more Montanans left the state because of the pressures of 
war and the opportunities created by it. (see Table 28, Appendix A). Montana's 
population "reached its lowest point in three decades. Montana suffered a net loss 
of 94,000 citizens, or 16.9 percent of its 1940 population."46 Despite these dismal 
statistics, Montana agrarians, with the help of federally-funded labor programs and 
reliable military consumers, pushed the annual income for agriculture to a record 
$266 million (See Table 2, Appendix A). 
Sugar beet growers planted 64,000 acres, 7,000 more then in 1943, and 
produced 682,000 tons with a value of over $7.2 million (see Table 21, Appendix 
A). Potato growers maintained their acreage above the 20,000 acre mark to 
maximize the 50 cents per bushel the government offered. Potato growers harvest­
ed over 2.5 million bushels with a value of almost $4 million, up over $500,000 
over 1943 (see Table 29, Appendix A). Grain growers increased their acreage but 
harvested 2000 fewer bushels, at a value of over $98,000 (see Table 22, Appendix 
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A). Flax seed also suffered a decline in production. After 1943, a record year for 
flax seed in which Montana farmers planted 568,000 acres, with a value of over 
$12 million, 1944 saw only 190,000 acres planted, with a value of just $4 million 
(see Table 32, Appendix A). The decline in flax seed acreage my be linked to the 
over production in 1943 and the lessening demand for this commodity by the war 
industry. Oats also declined in acres planted and bushels harvested (see Table 36, 
Appendix A). Wool production in the state also declined in 1944. Wool production 
in Montana dropped by over three million pounds in 1944, to 27.8 million pounds, 
cutting cash income by a million dollars to $12.2 million (see Table 37, Appendix 
A). On the other hand, cattle producers increased the number of animals on the 
farm to 1.7 million, up 1.2 million over 1943. The value of Montana's cattle 
increased by over $13 million (see Table 20, Appendix A). The 1944 farm year 
pushed the average income of Montana farmer up close to nearly $7,000 a year 
(see Table 3, Appendix A). 
Again, 1944 proved not to be a good year for the mining industry in 
Montana. Labor shortages continued to be the biggest deterrent. Even with the 
worker freeze, the mining industry was unable to attract and keep labor. Under the 
regulations of the worker freeze a worker could quit one "essential" job to take 
another if the new job was more beneficial to the war effort.47 The wages offered 
at other defense jobs proved more inviting. The arduous task of acquiring proper 
labor for the Montana mines is best reflected in the decline of Montana's annual 
mining income in 1944. It dropped over $2.6 million from 1943 to slightly over 
$89 million (see Table 4, Appendix A). The low production in mining can be at­
tributed to the ceiling on mineral prices and the lack of available labor. 
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Overall, Montanans who remained in the state did quite well, thanks to the 
war-inflated economy. Montana recorded 918 unemployed persons in June of 
1944. By December a mere 345 persons registered as unemployed (see Table 16, 
Appendix A). The average wage worker in Montana had a per-capita income of 
over eleven hundred dollars in 1944. This is over a hundred percent increase from 
1940, and $17 above the national average (see Table 18, Appendix A ) Montanans 
who remained in the state were finally making some money, and this fact is re­
flected in retail sales. In 1944 Montanans spent over $14 million, up over $1 mil­
lion over 1943 (see Table 6, Appendix A). The effects of money circulating in the 
Montana economy can best be seen in the decline in commercial failures. In 1944, 
Montana recorded no commercial failures (see Table 5, Appendix A). Montanans 
also welcomed the resurgence of federal highway funds. In 1944 Montana received 
$1.3 million in federal highway funds, which it used to improve 37 miles of 
highway. The state further received over $106,000 for repairs on secondary roads 
(see Table 12, Appendix A). Unfortunately Montana's tourist industry remained 
sluggish. In 1944, 652,068 tourists visited the state and spent $6.5 million. This 
was down by 35,000 visitors and $418,000 from 1943 (see Table 26, Appendix A) 
Montanans had made substantial economic advance in 1944, only to have a large 
chunk reclaimed by the federal government through excessive war taxes. In 1944 
Montana taxpayers contributed $48.2 million to the war effort, up over $20 million 
over 1943 (see Table 8, Appendix A). 
Montanans may have made some money in the war years, but taxes de­
signed to pay for the war moderated the increases. After all, all of the advances 
made in Montana after 1941 were related to the war. Further, the military advance 
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made by the close of 1944 indicated that the war's end would come in 1945. 
In 1945, the Montana labor force stood at 181,000 persons, the lowest level 
of the war and of the last 13 years (see Table 14, Appendix A). Despite these sta­
tistics Montana farmers would be assured of sufficient labor for the farm work of 
1945 under the guise of the "Braceros" program. Farmers received further good 
news in June. The War Production Board removed "all the restrictions on the sale 
of farm machinery."48 More good news arrived in early July. The U.S.D.A.'s 
new list of farm machinery still to be rationed contained only nineteen items as 
compared to thirty-one earlier in the war. Still on the list, however were tractors, 
beet diggers and potato diggers, the items most urgently needed by Montana 
farmers.49 Gas rationing was still in effect. Chester Bowles of Malta wrote Sena­
tor Murray asking "why gas rations must continue through the fall of 1945. "50 
Murray explained that "because of the greater distance to be covered in the Pacif­
ic", and the "vastly increasing activity in the [European] theater, the military needs 
for petroleum will be greater then in a two-front war."51 But increased consump­
tion of petroleum by the military would not effect the farmer from getting what he 
needs to preform his job on the farm.By the time the Montana farmer went into his 
fields in 1945, the Germans had surrendered and the Japanese were near capitula­
tion in the south Pacific. 
In the spring of 1945, Montana sugar beet growers put 81,000 acres into 
beets, slightly under the bumper year of 1940 (83,000 acres) (see Table 21. 
Appendix A). The 1945 sugar beet crop of 865,000 tons, with a value of over $8.7 
million, represented a $1.5 million increase over 1944.(see Table 21, Appendix 
A). Potato farmers, on the other hand, decreased their acreage by 6,000 acres to 
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15,000 acres in 1945. The potato farmers' crop in 1945 had a value of $3.2 mil­
lion, down over $655,000 from 1944 (see Table 29, Appendix A). Montana wool 
producers also decreased their output by 4 million pounds. In 1945 wool produc­
ers in Montana sheared 23.7 million pounds of wool, with a cash income of $10.4 
million, a $2 million drop in cash income from 1944 (see Table 37, Appendix A). 
Wheat acreage dropping by only 107 acres. Wheat farmers harvested 57,145 
bushels of wheat, with a value of $82,289. The value of the wheat harvest in 1945 
dropped by over $16,000 from 1944 (see Table 22, Appendix A). On the other 
hand, cattle producers in 1945 increased the number of cows by over 1.7 million, 
up 150,000 animals from 1944. The 1945 herd had a value of over $130.7 million, 
up slightly over a million dollars from 1944 (see Table 20, Appendix A). 
Nineteen-forty five was a relatively prosperous year for Montana's primary 
industry, but not as prosperous as the war years. The end of war had caused agri­
cultural producers to cut back slightly. In 1945 the annual agriculture income in 
Montana dropped to $234.5 million, a decline of over $31.6 million from 1944 
(see Table 2, Appendix A). This in turn cut the cash income per farmer in Monta­
na to $6,427 per year, $560 less than in 1944 but still $3,748 more than in 1940 
(see Table 3, Appendix A). 
Again in 1945, the demands of the war drastically affected the mining 
industry. Low wages and the lack of sufficient labor curtailed production. In 1945, 
the annual income for mines in the state dropped to $75.9 million, down by over 
$13 million from 1944. Mining receipts for 1945 were even lower then those 
collected in 1940 (see Table 4, Appendix A). The war had no positive effects on 
Montana's mining industry. The demands for labor in defense plants and the low 
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wages paid by the mines were too much for Montana's mining industry to over­
come. 
The war's end did not affect the wages brought home by Montana wage 
workers. In 1945, the per capita income in Montana stood at $1,244 a year, up $81 
from 1944 (see Table 18, Appendix A). This increase in earnings can be traced 
solely to an economy based on the production of war goods. But the increase in 
income experienced by the average Montanan was again assaulted by the horrific 
war tax. In 1945, Montana taxpayers shelled out a record $52.3 million in federal 
income tax, almost a 200 percent increase over 1940 (see Table 8, Appendix A). 
Regardless, folks in Montana were spending their money. In 1945, Montanans 
spent $15.9 million on retail sales, up $1.3 million from 1945 (see Table 6, 
Appendix A). Montanans were buying the better life. The federal government 
increased aid for highway works. In 1945, Montana received $1.34 million for 
highways, and over $87,000 for work on secondary roads. With this money 
Montana repaired and built forty-three miles of road (see Table 12, Appendix A). 
The increased work on roads and the ending of the war caused a surge in Monta­
na's tourist expenditures. In 1945, over a million tourists visited the state. While 
they were here they spent $16.4 million. This level of tourist expenditures is 
comparable to the 1942 season (see Table 26, Appendix A). 
Montana had made some gain in its traditional economy during the war. 
These gains could not have been made without the direct involvement of the feder­
al government. Montana had risen to the occasion and increased the production of 
its primary industry by over 100 percent. This increase in production helped push 
revenues generated by over 200 percent (see Table 2, Appendix A). How would 
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Montana maintain this level with no war? 
The question of Montana's future was addressed by Senators Murray and 
Wheeler who strove to develop foreign policies which insured markets for the 
commodities of Montana's farmers. The effects of these new policies on Montana 
are best illustrated in the rise of annual income for Montana's primary industry, 
agriculture. In 1946, Montana agriculture pulled in $290.2 million, up $56.7 
million from 1945. By 1947, the annual income for agriculture in Montana rose to 
a record $397.3 million, an astronomical climb of a $162.8 million from 1945 (see 
Table 2, Appendix A). 
By the end of the war, Montana was in the same position it had occupied 
before the war. The economy relied on the programs of the federal government to 
keep it going. No longer was this assistance as blatantly obvious as it was during 
the depression and the war; now federal aid and subsidies arrived under the guise 
of containing communism. No matter. Because Montana did not diversify its 
economy during the war, it continued to rely on the new overseer to finance its 
way of life. 
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SUMMARY 
World War II brought cataclysmic changes to the United States, particularly 
to its western states. The move American industry made to the western states did 
not benefit Montana economically in the long run. The idea put forth by Gerald D. 
Nash that the war allowed for the diversification of the western states' primary 
economic base, extractive industry, does not hold true for Montana. This is a direct 
result of the United States Federal Government's manipulative control of Monta­
na's extractive industries, particularly agriculture and mining. 
Montana's first contact with fiscal control by the Federal Government oc­
curred during the depression of the 1930's. The $434.4 million injection Montana 
received during the 1930's helped greatly to stabilize the economy and to shore up 
its primary industries, agriculture and mining. Montana survived the depression 
only because the United States Government paid the bill and created the jobs that 
put Montanans to work. Government intervention on Montana's behalf proved 
beneficial to the Montanan of the 1930's but in turn proved to be a detriment to 
Montanans during World War II. 
The United State's war time policies and objectives provided an effective 
inhibitor to the growth and diversification of Montana's primary economic base. In 
reality, it pushed the citizens of Montana to even deeper levels of heteronomy. The 
war displaced over 90,000 Montana citizens, making it even more difficult for 
Montanans to do what they do best, farm and mine. Other deterrents such as the 
booming war industry on the west coast, and the system of rationing all things 
essential and nonessential proved inhibiting. Again, it was only through the gov­
ernments involvement that Montana was able to over come these obstacles. 
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By 1945 Montana was firmly entrenched in its traditional economic base of 
extractive industry, not manufacturing. The war had not diversified Montana's 
economy one bit. In fact by 1945 Montana's average farm had increased to 1,500 
acres and 64 percent of all Montana farmers were using tractors. This is over a 25 
percent increase from 1940.1 The move toward mechanization on the farm acceler­
ated as a result of the massive drain on available labor. Due in part to this fact, by 
the war's end, Montana was producing more commodities then it had ever pro­
duced, in turn, creating another hurdle for Montana to over come. Here again, 
Montana received assistance from the Federal Government when Montana's Sena­
tors Murray and Wheeler strove to develop Foreign policies which insured Monta­
na farmers markets for their commodities. This in turn tightens the Federal feed 
bag to the Montana Producer, deepening Montana's level of heteronomy. 
Montana's war experience proved not to be one of new booming war indus­
tries or diversification of the population but, instead it was one of deprivation and 
sacrifice that was only over come by government intervention. Montana farmers 
did show a profit, but a profit made at the expense of economic diversification. K. 
Ross Toole said it best when he stated that Montana "had little to do with how it 
developed and what it became." 
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APPENDIX - A 
TABLE 1 
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CHANGE OF MANUFACTURING 
AS A WHOLE 
Comparative Gain, Or Loss, All Manufacturing, By State, 1929 1954 
Value Added Total Employment Value Total 
(Millions of (hundreds of Added Employmen 
State Dollars) emDlovees) (Percent) (Percent) 
MONTANA -67.0 -34.0 -33.6 -16.4 
IDAHO 21.0 -18.0 11.9 -7.2 
WYOMING -58.0 -15.0 -54.0 -20.6 
COLORADO 28.0 66.0 6.3 11.0 
NEW MEXICO 87.0 84.0 74.6 61.7 
ARIZONA 73.0 84.0 40.8 34.0 
UTAH 79.0 33.0 28.9 11.4 
NEVADA 38.0 34.0 65.0 64.1 
WASHINGTON 178.0 -69.0 12.0 -3.6 
OREGON 289.0 214.0 28.5 16.3 
CALIFORNIA 3746.0 4855.0 46.2 49.5 
Note: Comparative gain or loss measures the extent to which an area 
exceeded or fell short of the level it would have attained if it had 
grown at the U.S. rate between the indicated years. Comparitive gain 
(per cent) shows this comparative gain as a percentage of the area's 
actual level in 1954; comparative loss (per cent) shows the compara­
tive loss as a percentage of the hypothetical or expected 1954 level 
based on the U.S. rate of growth. 
Source: Victor R. Fuchs, Changes in the Location of 
Manufacturing in the United States Since 1929 (New Heaven: Yale 
University Press, 1962), 54. 
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Source: Roy J. W. Ely, Montana's 
Production: A Statistical Summary of the 
States Industry. 1930-1948. Bullet.# 12 
(Missoula: Bureau of Business Research, 
State University of Montana, 1948), 2. 
Agriculture Annual Income 
(|000,000) 
TABLE 3 
AVERAGE CASH INCOME 







1934 1, 670 
1935 2,174 
1936 1, 855 
1937 1, 989 
1938 1, 693 
1939 2,150 
1940 2, 679 
1941 3,730 
1942 4, 738 
1943 6,180 
1944 6, 987 
1945 6,427 
1946 8, 390 
1947 10,640 
Source: Roy J. W. Ely, Montana's Produc­
tion: A Statistical Summary of the States Industry. 
1930-1948. Bullet.# 12 (Missoula: Bureau of Busi­
ness Research, State University of Montana, 1948), 
3. 
























Source: Roy J. W. Ely, Montana's 
Production: A Statistical Summary of the 
States Industry. 1930-1948. Bullet.# 12 
(Missoula: Bureau of Business Research, 
State University of Montana, 1948), 25. 




1930 | 1932 1944 1936 1938 





YEAR BUSINESS FAILURES LIABILITIES 
1930 9,643 153 $2,443,000 
1931 9,448 130 1,377,000 
1932 9,215 128 961,000 
1933 9, 029 82 662,000 
1934 8, 817 39 334,000 
1935 8, 969 23 104,000 
1936 9,255 33 223,000 
1937 9,541 27 161,000 
1938 9,299 20 156,000 
1939 9,589 15 163,000 
1940 9, 626 12 57,000 
1941 9,899 15 82,000 
1942 9, 618 10 262,000 
1943 8, 648 4 19,000 
1944 8,206 0 0 
1945 8,138 1 8,000 
1946 9,218 3 55,000 
Source: Roy J. W. Ely, Montana's Production: A Statistical Summary of 
the States Industry. 1930-1947. Bullet.# 11 (Missoula: Bureau of Business Re­
search, State University of Montana, 1947), 47. 
COMMERCIAL FAILURES 
Liabilities Million* of Dollars 
2.6 i — —— 
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1944 14,666,561 # 
1945 15,977,752 # 
1946 21,577,954 # 
# Based on a percent increase in sales of 84 Monta­
na stores. 
Source: Roy J. W. Ely, Montana's Produc­
tion: A Statistical Summary of the States Industry, 
1930-1947, Bullet.# 11 (Missoula: Bureau of Busi­
ness Research, State University of Montana, 1947), 
54. 
RETAIL SALES 
Millions of Dollars 
1934 I 1936 I 1938 I 1940 |  1942 1930 1932 
1931 1933 1935 1937 1939 1941 1943 1945 
TABLE 7 
RAILROAD OPERATING REVENUE 
OTHER 
YEAR FREIGHT PASSENGERS REVENUE TOTAL 
1930 $7,991,689 $2 ,048,935 N/A $10,040,624 
1931 6,372,364 1 ,340,484 N/A 7,712,848 
1932 4,678,149 890,407 N/A 5,568,556 
1933 4,762,708 726,794 N/A 5,489,502 
1934 3,389,980 389,851 N/A 3,779,831 
1935 7,207,936 678,581 N/A 7,886,517 
1936 9,632,569 739,568 N/A 10,372,137 
1937 8,215,594 560,673 N/A 8,776,267 
1938 6,889,835 462,583 820,750 8,173,168 
1939 7,798,078 532,077 510,326 8,840,481 
1940 7,859,673 502,680 539,497 8,901,850 
1941 7,891,664 478,251 977,043 9,346,958 
1942 8,637,855 755,020 1,236,691 10,629,566 
1943 7,715,192 794,061 1,689,257 10,198,510 
1944 8,249,820 905,015 1,074,703 10,229,538 
1945 7,863,982 1 ,653,479 317,704 9,835,165 
Source: Roy J. W. Ely, Montana's Production: A 
Statistical Summary of the States Industry. 1930-1946. 
Bullet.# 10 (Missoula: Bureau of Business Research, State 
University of Montana, 1946), 54. 
RAILROAD OPERATING REVENUE 
Millions of Dollars (Prt & Pass.) 
12 | 
11 -
1930 1934 1936 1938 1942 
1931 1933 1935 1937 1939 1941 1943 1945 
TABLE 8 
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Source: Roy J. W. Ely, Montana's Produc­
tion: A Statistical Summary of the States Industry. 
1930-1947. Bullet.# 11 (Missoula: Bureau of Busi­
ness Research, State University of Montana, 1947), 
38. 
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1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 
EUC (CCC) 3.3 3.6 6.2 4.4 5.0 5.4 5.4 5.1 
HIGHWAYS 5.8 5.2 5.6 5.3 3.1 1.7 3.7 3.1 
PUBLIC BUILDINGS 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 
RECLAMATION 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.6 1.0 1.6 1.2 0.5 
CORPS. OF ENGINEERS, 
UAR DEPARTMENT U 3.7 28.0 25.0 24.3 13.6 11.2 7.2 3.0 
CUA 6.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
FERA 5.5 16.8 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
AAA 4.5 8.2 9.8 9.8 8.4 8.6 16.1 12.3 
PUA 1.4 3.4 2.3 1.7 1.8 3.6 ##3.8 0.8 
FSA 0.0 0.0 0.2 5.1 4.4 2.4 0.0 1.0 
UPA 0.0 0.0 7.2 12.5 10.5 15.3 8.9 8.0 
NYA 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 
OTHERS * 0.9 13.0 1.2 2.0 2.0 1.4 1.1 0.0 
SOCIAL SECURITY 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.2 1.2 2.2 2.0 2.3 
BOARD 
TOTALS 31.9 78.5 61.8 67.6 51.9 54.3 50.2 37.0 
ft May include parts of other state projects. 
## Includes FWA, Federal and Non Federal Grants and 
Non-Federal loans. 
* ERA, Grants-In-Aid, etc. 
Source: Roy J. W. Ely, Montana's Production: A Statistical Sum­
mary of the States Industry. 1930-1942. Bullet.# 6 (Missoula: Bureau of 


















1930 1935 1940 1930-35 1935-40 1930-40 
TOTAL NUMBER OF FARMS 47,495 50,564 41,823 6.5% -17.3% -11.9% 
UNDER 3 ACRES 254 340 145 33.9% -57.4% -42.9% 
3 TO 9 ACRES 746 1,261 1,321 69.0% 4.8% 77.1% 
10 TO 19 ACRES 610 960 974 57.4% 1.5% 59.7% 
20 TO 49 ACRES 1,477 2,147 2,002 45.4% -6.8% 35.5% 
50 TO 99 ACRES 2,161 2,920 2,844 35.1% -2.6% 31.6% 
100 TO 499 ACRES 19,479 20,523 15,308 5.4% -25.4% -21.4% 
500 TO 999 ACRES 12,267 11,628 8,614 -5.2% -25.9% -29.8% 
1,000 ACRES & OVER 10,501 10,785 10,615 2.7% -1.6% 1.1% 
U. S. Department of Agriculture Economics Bureau General Publication. 
Tabulation from U. S. Census. Regarding The Land And The People On The 
Land. Wahington D. C.: GPO., 1941, p. 24. 
TABLE 11 
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COPPER PRODUCTION IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND MONTANA 
MONTANA'S MONTANA'S VALUE OF 
PRODUCTION (SHORT TONS) PERCENTAGE OF RANK AMONG PRODUCTION 
YEAR U.S MONTANA TOTAL PROD. STATES IN MONTANA 
1930 705,074 98,094 13.9 2ND $25,504,378 
1931 528,875 92,278 17.4 2ND 16,794,572 
1932 238,111 42,424 17.8 2ND 5,345,383 
1933 190,643 32,738 17.2 3RD 4,190,488 
1934 237,405 31,632 13.3 3RD 5,061,200 
1935 382,290 77,460 20.3 2ND 12,861,470 
1936 614,516 109,544 17.8 3RD 20,156,096 
1937 841,998 144,528 17.2 3RD 34,975,776 
1938 557,763 77,213 13.8 3RD 15,133,748 
1939 728,320 97,827 13.5 3RD 20,348,016 
1940 878,086 126,391 14.4 3RD 28,564,366 
1941 958,149 128,036 13.4 3RD 30,216,496 
1942 1,080,061 141,104 13.1 3RD 34,168,948 
1943 1,090,818 134,525 12.3 3RD 34,976,500 
1944 972,549 118,190 12.2 3RD 31,911,300 
1945 772,894 88,506 11.4 3RD 23,896,620 
1946 608,737 58,481 9.6 3RD 18,947,844 
Source: Roy J. W. Ely, Montana's Production: A Statisical Summary 
of the States Industry. 1930- 1949. Bullet.# 13 (Missoula: Bureau of Business 
Research, State University of Montana, 1950),46. 
TABLE 12 
HIGHWAY CONTRACTS 
FEDERAL FEDERAL SECONDARY 
YEAR MILEAGE CONTRACTS CONTRACTS 
1930 600 3,646,582 N/A 
1931 1,225 9,636,975 N/A 
1932 1,086 7,013,169 N/A 
1933 656 7,403,818 1,884,905 
1934 329 3,208,438 1,867,313 
1935 527 7,906,326 2,770,420 
1936 355 5,785,574 1,431,485 
1937 260 4,451,837 318,198 
1938 95 2,123,618 352,878 
1939 382 5,266,035 1,149,902 
1940 453 5,022,910 933,612 
1941 355 4,792,319 614,612 
1942 44 796,245 48,111 
1943 5 533,968 0 
1944 37 1,338,387 108,196 
1945 43 1,346,422 87,292 
1946 263 4,236,963 854,594 
Source: Roy J. W. Ely, Montana's Production: A Statistical 
Summary of the States Industry. 1930-1947. Bulletin No. 11, Page 59. 
HIGHWAY GONTRACTS 
Millions of Dollars (Federal Aid) 
11 I 
1930 1936 1934 
1931 1933 1935 1937 1939 1941 1943 1945 
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TABLE 13 
CHANGES IN POPULATION OF THE STATE BY COUNTIES 
BETWEEN 1930 AND 1940, 1940 - 1943 
ESTIMATED 
CIVILIAN PERCENT TOTAL TOTAL PERCENT CIVILIAN 
POPULATION POPULATION CHANGE POPULATION POPULATION CHANGI 
1930 1940 1930-1940 1940 (APR 1) 1943 (NOV 1) 1940 - ' 
MONTANA 5377506 5597556 4.1 "558,270 S707033 1̂578" 
COUNTIES 
BEAVERHEAD 6,654 6,943 4.3 6,943 5,547 -20.1 
BIGHORN 8,543 10,419 22.0 10,419 8,494 -18.5 
BLAINE 9,006 9,566 6.2 9,566 7,739 -19.1 
BROADWATER 2,738 3,451 26.0 3,451 2,228 -35.4 
CARBON 12,571 11,865 -5.6 11,865 9,187 -22.6 
CARTER 4,136 3,280 -20.7 3,280 2,633 -19.7 
CASCADE 41,146 41,999 2.1 41,999 42,016 .0 
CHOUTEAU 8,635 7,316 -15.3 7,316 5,541 -24.3 
CUSTER 11,242 10,422 -7.3 10,422 9,220 -11.5 
DANIELS 5,553 4,563 -17.8 4,563 3,580 -21.5 
DAUSON 9,881 8,618 -12.8 8,618 7,598 -11.8 
DEER LODGE 16,293 13,627 -16.4 13,627 14,061 3.2 
FALLON 4,568 3,719 -18.6 3,719 3,063 -17.6 
FERGUS 16,531 14,040 -15.1 14,040 11,491 -18.2 
FLATHEAD 19,200 24,271 26.4 24,271 19,367 -20.2 
GALLATIN 16,124 18,269 13.3 18,269 14,934 -18.3 
GARFIELD 4,252 2,641 -37.9 2,641 1,999 -24.3 
GLACIER 5,297 9,034 70.5 9,034 7,949 -12.0 
GOLDEN VALLEY 2,126 1,607 -24.4 1,607 1,144 -28.8 
GRANITE 3,013 3,401 12.9 3,401 2,605 -23.4 
HILL 13,775 13,304 -3.4 13,304 11,108 -16.5 
JEFFERSON 4,133 4,644 12.4 4,664 3,444 -26.2 
JUDITH BASIN 5,238 3,655 -30.2 3,655 3,094 -15.3 
LAKE 9,541 13,490 41.4 13,490 9,911 -26.5 
LEWIS AND CLAR 18,224 22,131 21.4 22,131 18,083 -18.3 
LIBERTY 2,198 2,209 0.5 2,209 1,676 -24.1 
LINCOLN 7,089 7,882 11.2 7,882 6,354 -19.4 
MC CONE 4,790 3,798 -20.7 3,798 2,562 -32.5 
MADISON 6,323 7,294 15.4 7,294 4,979 -31.7 
MEAGHER 2,272 2,237 -1.5 2,237 1,615 -27.8 
MINERAL 1,626 2,135 31.3 2,135 1,617 -24.3 
MISSOULA 21,782 29,038 33.3 27,852 24,187 -13.2 
MUSSELSHELL 7,242 5,717 -21.1 5,717 4,564 -20.2 
PARK 10,922 11,566 5.9 11,566 9,474 -18.1 
PETROLEUM 2,045 1,083 -47.0 1,080 831 -23.1 
PHILLIPS 8,208 7,892 -3.8 7,892 5,906 -25.2 
PONDERA 6,964 6,716 -3.6 6,716 5,394 -19.7 
POWDER RIVER 3,909 3,159 -19.2 3,159 2,463 -22.0 
POWELL 6,202 6,152 -0.8 6,152 5,651 -8.1 
PRAIRIE 3,941 2,410 -38.8 2,410 2,075 -13.9 
RAVALLI 10,315 12,978 25.8 12,978 10,206 -21.4 
RICHLAND 9,633 10,209 6.0 10,209 8,737 -14.4 
ROOSAVELT 10,672 9,806 -8.1 9,806 8,696 -11.3 
ROSEBUD 7,347 6,477 -11.8 6,477 5,644 -12.9 
SANDERS 5,692 6,926 21.7 6,925 5,807 -16.1 
SHERIDAN 9,869 7,814 -20.8 7,814 5,963 -23.7 
SILVER BOW 56,969 53,207 -6.6 53,207 46,355 -12.9 
STILLWATER 6,253 5,694 -8.9 5,694 5,158 -9.4 
SWEET GRASS 3,944 3,719 -5.7 3,719 2,928 -21.3 
TETON 6,068 6,922 14.1 6,922 5,976 -13.7 
TOOLE 6,714 6,769 0.8 6,769 5,482 -19.0 
TREASURE 1,661 1,499 -9.8 1,499 1,312 -12.5 
VALLEY 11,181 15,181 35.8 15,181 9,377 -38.2 
WHEATLAND 3,751 3,286 -12.4 3,286 2,811 -14.5 
WIBAUX 2,767 2,161 -21.9 2,161 1,890 -12.5 
YELLOWSTONE 30,785 41,182 33.8 41,182 37,907 -8.0 
Source: Roy J. W. Ely. Montana's Production: A Statistical Summary of the 
States Industry. 1930-1944. Bullet, ft 8 (Missoula: bureau ot business Kesearcn, state 
University or Montana, iv44), 4. 
TABLE 14 
TOTAL LABOR FORCE 
AND CIVILIAN EMPLOYED 
CIVILIAN 
YEAR LABOR FORCE EMPLOYED 
1933 218,000 158,000 
1934 220,000 165,000 
1935 221,000 171,000 
1936 223,000 178,000 
1937 224,000 179,000 
1938 224,000 179,000 
1939 223,000 182,000 
1940 225,000 186,000 
1941 208,000 173,000 
1942 186,000 176,000 
1943 184,000 179,000 
1944 184,000 181,000 
1945 181,000 178,000 
1946 219,000 209,000 
1947 231,000 218,000 
Source: Roy J. W. Ely, Montata's Production: A Statis­
tical Summary of the States Industry. 1930-1948. Bullet.# 12 
(Missoula: Bureau of Business Research, State University of 
Montana, 1948), 61. 
TOTAL LABOR FORCE & CIVILIAN EMPLOYED 
Thousands of Civilians Employed 
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MONTANA AGE AND SEX RATIOS 
1930 1940 1950 
AGE PROPORTIONS (%) 
Under 15 Years 29.7 25.4 28 . 8 
15 to 64 Years 65.3 68.2 62 . 6 
65 Years & Over 5.0 6.5 8 . 6 
INDEX OF AGING 16.7 25 . 6 29 .9 
POPULATION DENSITY 3.7 3.8 4.1 
PERCENT CHANGE -2 . 1 4.6 5.6 
POPULATION 537,606 559,45 6 591,024 
SEX RATIOS 119 . 9 114. 8 109.8 
PERCENT URBAN 33.7 37 . 8 43.7 
AGE SPECIFIC SEX RATIOS 
AGE 1930 AGE 1940 1950 
Under 5 104.3 Under 5 102.7 102.6 
5 - 9 104.1 5 - 9 103. 9 104.6 
10 - 14 103.1 10 - 14 104.1 104.7 
15 - 19 103.8 15 - 19 104.8 102.1 
20 - 24 113.0 20 - 24 105.5 104.9 
25 - 29 111.7 25 - 29 110.0 106.0 
30 - 34 113.1 30 - 34 115.9 103.5 
35 - 44 129.2 35 - 39 114.3 107.9 
45 - 54 152.1 40 - 44 112 . 6 116.4 
55 - 64 153.9 45 - 49 118.4 117 .5 
65 - 74 165.6 50 - 54 137 .5 113.2 
75 & Over 149.8 55 - 59 148.2 116.9 
60 - 64 145.9 132 .1 
65 - 69 133.4 134 .7 
70 - 74 142.7 128.3 
75 & Over 137 .4 118.4 
Johnson, Robert R. "Population Dynamics and Related Economic Trends in 




JUNE 30 DECEMBER 31 TOTAL 
MEN WOMEN MEN WOMEN JUNE 30 
1934 44,734 6,453 35,296 3, 345 51,187 
1935 28,281 3,603 42,181 7, 995 31,884 
1936 23,932 4, 982 32,844 6,111 28,914 
1937** 25,693 5,519 19,216 4,117 31,212 
1938 32,787 5, 100 28,152 5, 028 37,887 
1939 28,383 4,290 23,649 4,971 32,673 
1940 25,378 4, 634 16,139 3, 011 30,012 
1941 11,371 3, 384 8,949 2,721 14,755 
1942 7,698 (total) 1,582 804 7, 698 
1943*** 454 516 309 304 970 
1944 918 (total) 345 (total) 918 
1945 282 523 4,001 1, 688 805 
1946 5, 028 1,466 5, 863 1,223 6,494 
* A record of unemployed persons registered and available for work as taken from the 
active file of the Montana State Employment Service. 
** Actual unemployment is greater than the registered unemployed. The unemploy­
ment Census of 1937 revealeid the unemployment to be about 25% greater than the 
active file for that year. 
*** The Commission at Helena reports that in view of the small number of persons 
seeking employment the count since September, 1943 has been abandoned. Montana 
Production - A statistical summary of the state's industry 1930 - 1947. Roy J. W. Ely, 
Department of Economics, The Bureau of Business Research, Montana State Universi­
ty Missoula, Montana. Bulletin No. 11, Page 58. 
Source: Roy J. W. Ely, Montana's Production: A Statistical Summary of the 
States Industry. 1930-1947. Bullet.# 11 (Missoula: Bureau of Business Research,"State 
University of Montana, 1947), 58. 
REGISTERED UNEMPLOYMENT 
Total In Thouaands (June 30) 
60 i-
1934 1936 1936 
1935 1937M 1939 1941 1943*** 1945 
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TABLE 17 
Breakdown of Population and 
Labor Forces 
in Montana in 1940 
Population Number of 
Description Individuals 
Total population 559,456 
Total male population 299,009 
Total male population 
14 years and older 231,877 
Total males in the 
labor force 186,055 
Total males in the 
labor force 14 years 
and older 149,215 
Total males in civilian 
labor force 185,155 
Total males employed in 
the civilian labor force 152,400 
Total males unemployed in 
the civilian labor force 32,755 
Total males engaged in 
agriculture 56,8 60 
U. S. Department of Commerce. 17th Census of the popula­
tion. Vol. 2, Characteristics of the Population, part 26, 
Montana. Washington D. C.: GPO., 1951. 
TABLE 18 
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PER CAPITA INCOME PAYMENTS 
MONTANA AND UNITED STATES 
UNITED 
YEAR MONTANA STATES 
1 9 2 9  $ 6 0 2  $ 6 8 0  
1 9 3 0  4 9 0  5 9 6  
1 9 3 1  3 9 3  5 0 0  
1 9 3 2  2 9 0  3 8 0  
1 9 3 3  2 9 0  3 6 8  
1 9 3 4  3 8 7  4 2 0  
1 9 3 5  4 5 5  4 6 0  
1 9 3 6  5 1 4  5 3 1  
1 9 3 7  5 4 1  5 6 1  
1 9 3 8  4 8 8  5 0 9  
1 9 3 9  5 1 5  5 3 9  
1 9 4 0  5 7 4  5 7 5  
1 9 4 1  6 7 0  6 9 3  
1 9 4 2  9 0 0  8 7 0  
1 9 4 3  1 , 0 6 2  1 , 0 4 5  
1 9 4 4  1 , 1 6 3  1 , 1 4 5  
1 9 4 5  1 , 2 4 4  1 , 1 7 7  
1 9 4 6  1 , 3 9 2  1 , 2 1 3  
1 9 4 7  1 ,  6 4 1  1 ,  3 2 3  
Source: Roy J. W. Ely, Montana's Production: A Statistical 
Summary of the States Industry7" 1930-1948. Eullet.# 12 
(Missoula: Bureau of Business Research, State University of 
Montana, 1948), 39. 
Per Capita Income Payments 
Montana U.S. 
1.8 |  
1.7 -
1939 I 1941 I 1943 1929 1945 1947 1937 
1930 1932 1934 1936 1938 1940 1942 1944 1946 
Montana ESSSS1 U.S. 
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TABLE 19 
TOTAL INCOME PAYMENTS 
TO INDIVIDUALS 
EACH TYPE AS PERCENT OF TOTAL 
MONTANA AND THE UNITED STATES, 1929 - 1950 
MONTANA UNITED STATES 
Wages Proprie­ Prop­ Wages Proprie­ Prop­ hont. , 
and tors' erty Other and tors' erty Other % of U 
YEAR Salaries Income Income Income Total Salaries Income Income Income Total Total 
1933 64.6 16.5 10.8 8.2 100.1 61.7 14.3 18.9 5.1 100.0 0.34 
1939 59.0 22.9 8.7 9.4 100.0 62.1 15.5 15.6 6.7 100.0 0.41 
19AO 56.4 26.2 9.3 8.1 100.0 63.3 15.6 14.9 6.2 100.0 0.42 
1941 52.7 33.3 7.5 6.5 100.0 65.0 17.1 13.3 4.6 100.0 0.40 
1942 50.6 37.3 7.6 4.5 100.0 66.5 18.9 11.0 3.6 100.0 0.40 
1943 49.9 38.4 7.5 4.2 100.0 68.0 18.3 9.7 4.1 100.0 0.37 
1944 48.7 37.7 7.7 5.9 100.0 66.2 18.3 9.4 6.1 100.0 0.36 
1945 47.3 36.8 8.1 7.8 100.0 63.1 19.1 9.6 8.2 100.0 0.37 
1946 47.2 37.8 8.4 6.6 100.0 61.5 20.8 10.2 7.4 100.0 0.39 
1947 46.7 40.0 8.0 5.3 100.0 64.1 19.1 10.4 6.5 100.0 0.43 
Source: Harold J. Hoflich, The Economy Of Montana. (Missoula: Bureau of 
Business and Economic Research School of Business Administration, Montana State 
University, 1951), Page 5. 
TABLE 20 
CATTLE ON FARMS 
YEAR ANIMALS # VALUE 
1 9 3 0  1 , 2 2 6 , 0 0 0  $ 6 5 , 9 5 9 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 1  1 , 2 6 3 , 0 0 0  4 9 , 0 0 4 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 2  1 , 2 7 6 , 0 0 0  3 0 , 6 2 4 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 3  1 , 4 5 0 , 0 0 0  3 0 , 3 0 5 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 4  1 , 7 0 4 , 0 0 0  2 9 , 2 3 5 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 5  1 , 5 3 0 , 0 0 0  2 7 , 3 4 2 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 6  1 , 3 6 2 , 0 0 0  4 3 , 4 0 4 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 7  9 7 4 , 0 0 0  2 9 , 0 8 6 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 8  8 9 0 , 0 0 0  3 1 , 2 1 7 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 9  1 , 0 0 6 , 0 0 0  4 0 , 8 3 7 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 0  1 , 1 4 8 , 0 0 0  5 2 , 6 7 2 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 1  1 , 2 7 4 , 0 0 0  6 1 , 0 5 8 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 2  1 , 3 8 9 , 0 0 0  8 2 , 4 4 7 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 3  1 , 5 2 8 , 0 0 0  1 1 6 , 0 7 5 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 4  1 , 7 5 7 , 0 0 0  1 2 9 , 7 6 3 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 5  1 , 7 7 5 , 0 0 0  1 3 0 , 7 4 7 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 6  1 , 9 2 5 , 0 0 0  1 5 2 , 8 4 5 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 7  1 , 8 2 9 , 0 0 0  1 7 8 , 8 7 6 , 0 0 0  
ft On farms January 1. 
Source: Roy J. W. Ely, Montana's Production: A 
Statistical Summary of the States Industry. 1930-1948. Bul­
let.# 12 (Missoula: Bureau of Business Research, State Uni­
versity of Montana, 1948), 17. 
2.1 
Cattle On Farms 




YEAR HARVESTED TONS VALUE 
1930 45,000 572,000 $4,193,000 
1931 54,000 617,000 3,708,000 
1932 54,000 739,000 3,983,000 
1933 68,000 838,000 4,575,000 
1934 64,000 786,000 4,095,000 
1935 51,000 570,000 3,625,000 
1936 60,000 654,000 4,120,000 
1937 70,000 852,000 4,490,000 
1938 78,000 987,000 4,511,000 
1939 74,000 894,000 4,309,000 
1940 83,000 1, 166,000 5,772,000 
1941 64,000 793,000 5,369,000 
1942 75,000 915,000 6,680,000 
1943 57,000 581,000 5,324,000 
1944 64,000 682,000 7,229,000 
1945 81,000 865,000 8,710,000 
1946 73,000 891,000 9,712,000 
1947 77,000 893,000 9,734,000 
Source: Roy J. W. Ely, Montana's Production: A Statisical 
Summary of the States Industry. 1930-1948. Bullet.# 12 (Missoula: 
Bureau of Business Research, State University of Montana, 
1948), 12. 
SUGAR BEETS 
Millions of Ton* 
1.30 | 
1930 | 1932 I 1934 | 1936 ] 1938 ]19+0 | 1942 I 1944 
1931 1933 1935 1937 1939 1941 1943 
TABLE 22 
WHEAT 
(Amounts In Thousands) 
ACRES 
YEAR HARVESTED BUSHELS VALUE 
1930 4,217 35,313 $20,128 
1931 2, 182 14,478 7,239 
1932 4,021 54,593 18,562 
1933 3,512 26,810 16,890 
1934 2,481 27,624 23,757 
1935 3,434 34,157 31,424 
1936 2,239 11,866 14,477 
1937 2, 624 20,401 19,993 
1938 4,249 64,837 30,473 
1939 3,401 4, 612 28,589 
1940 3, 917 51,676 31,522 
1941 3,703 68,239 59,368 
1942 3,267 73,783 75,996 
1943 3,490 77,023 97,049 
1944 3,884 74,764 98,688 
1945 3,777 57,145 82,289 
1946 4, 133 62,888 116,343 
1947 4, 306 64,325 153,094 
Source: Roy J. W. Ely, Montana's Production: A Statis­
tical Summary of the States Industry. 1930-1948. Bullet.# 12 
(Missoula: Bureau of Business Research, State University of 
Montana, 1948), 7. 
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1930 1942 1932 1936 
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TABLE 23 
COPPER 
YEAR POUNDS VALUE 
1930 196 , 187 ,523 $25 ,504 , 378 
1931 184 ,555 , 735 16 ,794 ,572 
1932 84 ,847 , 349 5 ,345 ,383 
1933 65 ,476 , 375 4 , 190 ,488 
1934 63 ,265 ,000 5 ,061 ,200 
1935 154 ,957 ,470 12 ,861 ,470 
1936 219 ,088 ,000 20 , 156 ,096 
1937 289 ,056 , 000 34 , 975 ,776 
1938 154 ,426 ,000 15 , 133 ,748 
1939 195 , 654 ,000 20 , 348 ,016 
1940 252 , 782 ,000 28 ,564 , 366 
1941 256 , 072 ,000 30 ,216 ,496 
1942 282 , 388 , 000 34 , 168 ,948 
1943 269 ,050 ,000 34 ,976 ,500 
1944 236 , 380 ,000 31 ,911 , 300 
1945 177 ,012 ,000 23 ,896 , 620 
1946 116 ,962 ,000 18 , 947 ,844 
1947 115 ,250 , 000 24 ,087 ,250 
Source: Roy J. W. Ely, Montana's Production: 
A Statistical Summary of the States Industry. 1930-
1948. Bullet.# 12 (Missoula: Bureau of Business Re­
search, State University of Montana, 1948), 26. 
COPPER 
Million* of Pound* 
320 I 
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1931 1933 1 935 1937 1939 1941 1943 1945 1947 
TABLE 24 
ZINC 
YEAR SHORT TONS VALUE 
1 9 3 0  2 6 , 4 2 1  $ 2 , 5 3 6 , 3 7 3  
1 9 3 1  6 , 7 4 7  5 1 2 , 8 0 9  
1 9 3 2  2 , 1 9 7  1 3 1 , 7 9 1  
1 9 3 3  2 0 , 7 2 4  1 , 7 4 0 , 8 5 4  
1 9 3 4  3 0 , 7 2 1  2 , 6 4 2 , 0 1 7  
1 9 3 5  5 4 , 7 8 1  4 , 8 2 0 , 7 0 5  
1 9 3 6  4 9 , 7 1 7  4 , 9 7 1 , 7 0 0  
1 9 3 7  3 9 , 1 6 8  5 , 0 9 1 , 8 4 0  
1 9 3 8  8 , 8 4 4  8 4 9 , 0 2 4  
1 9 3 9  3 4 , 7 9 9  3 , 6 1 8 , 0 9 6  
1 9 4 0  5 2 , 5 8 7  6 , 6 2 5 , 9 6 2  
1 9 4 1  6 0 , 7 1 0  9 , 1 0 6 , 5 0 0  
1 9 4 2  5 4 , 7 1 5  1 0 , 1 7 6 , 9 9 0  
1 9 4 3  3 7 , 6 0 6  8 , 1 2 2 , 8 9 6  
1 9 4 4  3 6 , 1 2 7  8 , 2 3 6 , 9 5 6  
1 9 4 5  1 7 , 4 0 3  4 , 0 0 2 , 6 9 0  
1 9 4 6  1 6 , 7 7 0  4 , 0 9 1 , 8 8 0  
1 9 4 7  4 2 , 7 7 5  1 , 0 0 9 , 3 5 0  
Source: Roy J. W. Ely, Montana's Produc­
tion: A Statistical Summary of the States Industry. 
1930-1948. Bullet.# 12 (Missoula: Bureau of Busi­
ness Research, State University of Montana, 1948), 
28. 
ZINC 
Thousands of Tons 
fi 
1936 I 1938 
t 1937 i 
1946 1930 1932 1934 1940 
1931 1933 1941 1939 
TABLE 25 
92 
LEAD PRODUCTION IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND MONTANA 
MONTANA'S MONTANA'S VALUE OF 
PRODUCTION (SHORT TONS) PERCENTAGE OF RANK AMONG PRODUCTION 
YEAR U.S. MONTANA TOTAL PROD. STATES IN MONTANA 
1930 558,313 10,653 1.9% 8TH $1,065,302 
1931 404,622 4,430 1.1% 10TH 327,827 
1932 292,968 1,079 0.4% 12TH 64,733 
1933 272,677 6,582 2.4% 6TH 487,047 
1934 278,339 10,005 3.6% 6TH 740,370 
1935 331,103 15,589 4.7% 5TH 1,247,101 
1936 372,919 19,059 5.1% 5TH 1,753,426 
1937 464,892 17,957 3.9% 5TH 2,118,926 
1938 369,726 9,327 2.5% 7TH 858,084 
1939 413,979 16,555 4.0% 5TH 1,556,170 
1940 457,392 23,036 5.0% 4TH 2,303,600 
1941 461,426 21,259 4.6% 5TH 2,423,526 
1942 496,239 20,050 4.0% 5TH 2,686,700 
1943 453,313 16,324 3.6% 6TH 2,448,600 
1944 416,861 13,105 3.1% 7TH 2,096,800 
1945 390,831 9,999 2.6% 7TH 1,719,828 
1946 335,475 8,280 2.5% 8TH 1,805,040 
Source: Roy J. W. Ely, Montana's Production: A Statisical Summary 
of the States Industry. 1930-1949. Bullet.# 13 (Missoula: Bureau of Business 
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TABLE 26 
TOURIST EXPENDITURES 
Annual estimates. Includes only travel by automobile. 
YEAR TOURISTS EXPENDITURES 
1 9 3 5  1 , 2 9 6 , 0 0 0  $ 2 5 , 5 5 1 , 2 0 0  
1 9 3 6  1 , 4 1 3 , 7 5 0  3 0 , 2 9 3 , 4 0 0  
1 9 3 7  1 , 3 3 3 , 7 2 1  2 7 , 6 7 7 , 1 5 2  
1 9 3 8  1 , 1 2 5 , 0 0 0  2 7 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 9  1 , 0 1 6 , 0 0 0  2 3 , 3 6 3 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 0  1 , 7 2 6 , 9 5 0  2 8 , 6 5 0 , 1 0 0  
1 9 4 1  1 , 7 7 4 , 7 8 2  2 9 , 7 3 7 , 7 2 1  
1 9 4 2  1 , 1 0 7 , 6 9 0  1 6 , 0 9 4 , 7 3 5  
1 9 4 3  6 8 7 , 6 0 0  8 , 9 3 8 , 8 0 0  
1 9 4 4  6 5 2 , 0 6 8  6 , 5 2 0 , 6 8 0  
1 9 4 5  1 , 0 9 7 , 7 3 5  1 6 , 4 6 6 , 0 2 5  
1 9 4 6  2 , 8 5 7 , 3 9 9  5 3 , 8 6 1 , 9 7 1  
Source: Roy J. W. Ely, Montana's Produc­
tion: A Statistical Summary of the States Industry, 
1930-1947, Bullet.# 11 (Missoula: Bureau of Busi­
ness Research, State University of Montana, 1947), 
60. 
TOURIST EXPENDITURES 
Millions of Dollars 
1935 1936 1937 1930 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 
TABLE 27 
BUILDING PERMITS 
YEAR PERMITS # VALUE 
1 9 3 0  1 ,  1 0 0  $ 2 , 4 8 4 , 3 0 0  
1 9 3 1  8 7 3  1 , 5 2 8 , 6 0 0  
1 9 3 2  6 1 0  5 3 4 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 3  5 3 9  5 1 0 , 2 0 0  
1 9 3 4  5 4 8  1 , 0 3 2 , 8 0 0  
1 9 3 5  1 ,  1 8 5  1 , 5 5 2 , 6 0 0  
1 9 3 6  1 , 4 5 8  2 ,  9 9 7 , 9 0 0  
1 9 3 7  1 , 2 1 6  2 , 5 2 3 , 4 0 0  
1 9 3 8  1 , 0 5 5  2 ,  1 7 4 , 5 5 0  
1 9 3 9  1 , 2 9 5  2 , 3 6 5 , 5 5 0  
1 9 4 0  1 , 5 9 5  4 , 7 2 2 , 8 8 0  
1 9 4 1  1 , 2 5 3  3 , 2 5 6 , 8 8 0  
1 9 4 2  4 9 2  3 4 3 , 6 6 0  
1 9 4 3  4 7 5  9 7 4 , 2 1 0  
1 9 4 4  6 5 5  9 3 7 , 5 6 0  
1 9 4 5  7 8 6  2 , 3 0 8 , 2 0 0  
1 9 4 6  1 , 4 5 0  3 , 5 0 4 , 8 3 0  
# - issued in Missoula, Great Falls, Helena, and 
Butte. 
Source: Roy J. W. Ely, Montana's Produc­
tion: A Statistical Summary of the States Industry. 
1930-1947. Bullet.# 11 (Missoula: Bureau of Busi­
ness Research, State University of Montana, 1947), 
59. 
BUILDING PERMITS 
Value — Millions of Dollars 
1930 1940 1934 
1931 1933 1935 1937 1939 1941 1943 1943 
TABLE 28 
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TOTAL POPULATION OF 
MONTANA 1940 - 1950 
YEAR 
1 9 4 0  
1 9 4 1  
1 9 4 2  
1 9 4 3  
1 9 4 4  
1 9 4 5  
Population 
(thousands) 
5 5 6  
5 4 4  
5 2 2  
4 8 7  
4 6 2  





- 2 2  
- 3 5  
- 2 5  
+ 3 2  
-2.2 
- 4 . 0  
- 6 . 7  
- 5  .  1  
+  6  .  9  
Harold J. Hoflich, The Economy Of Montana. (Missoula: Bu­
reau of Business and Economic Research School of Business Administra­




YEAR HARVESTED BUSHELS VALUE 
1 9 3 0  1 9 , 0 0 0  1 , 7 1 0 , 0 0 0  $ 1 , 8 1 3 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 1  2 1 , 0 0 0  1 , 7 8 5 , 0 0 0  1 , 0 1 7 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 2  2 2 , 0 0 0  2 , 2 0 0 , 0 0 0  8 8 0 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 3  2 3 , 0 0 0  2 , 0 7 0 , 0 0 0  1 , 4 0 8 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 4  2 3 , 0 0 0  1 , 7 9 4 , 0 0 0  1 , 3 2 8 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 5  1 9 , 0 0 0  1 , 6 1 5 , 0 0 0  1 , 2 9 2 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 6  1 6 , 0 0 0  1 , 4 4 0 , 0 0 0  1 , 7 4 2 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 7  1 8 , 0 0 0  1 , 8 0 0 , 0 0 0  8 8 2 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 8  1 6 , 0 0 0  1 , 4 4 0 , 0 0 0  1 , 0 3 7 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 9  1 5 , 0 0 0  1 , 2 7 5 , 0 0 0  1 , 1 3 5 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 0  1 5 , 0 0 0  1 , 7 2 5 , 0 0 0  9 4 9 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 1  1 4 , 0 0 0  1 , 5 4 0 , 0 0 0  1 , 3 5 5 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 2  1 5 , 0 0 0  1 , 7 2 5 , 0 0 0  2 , 2 7 7 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 3  2 3 , 0 0 0  2 , 6 4 5 , 0 0 0  3 , 3 8 6 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 4  2 1 , 0 0 0  2 , 5 2 0 , 0 0 0  3 , 9 0 6 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 5  1 5 , 0 0 0  2 , 1 2 5 , 0 0 0  3 , 2 5 1 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 6  1 6 , 0 0 0  2 , 2 1 0 , 0 0 0  3 , 2 7 1 , 0 0 0  
Source: Roy J. W. Ely, Montana's Production: A Statistical 
Summary of the States Industry. 1930-1948. Bullet.# 12 (Missoula: Bu­
reau of Business Research, State University of Montana, 1948), 16. 
POTATOES 
Millions of Bushel* 
TABLE 30 
GOLD 
Montana's Montana's Value of 
Production(Fine Ounces) Percentage of Rank Among Production 
Year United States Montana Total Prod. States in Montana 
1930 2,138,742 43,489 2.0 8th $899,001 
1931 2,406,737 40,112 1.7 9th 829,192 
1932 2,513,757 40,602 1.6 9th 839,318 
1933 2,571,259 57,822 2.2 10th 1,477,935 
1934 3,119,160 97,446 3.1 8th 3,405,736 
1935 3,236,951 151,088 4.7 8th 5,288,081 
1936 3,782,667 180,209 4.8 8th 6,307,322 
1937 4,117,078 202,252 4.9 8th 7,078,820 
1938 4,267,269 203,313 4.8 7th 7,115,955 
1939 4,673,042 264,173 5.7 8th 9,246,055 
1940 4,869,949 272,602 5.6 8th 9,451,070 
1941 4,750,865 246,475 5.2 8th 8,626,625 
1942 3,457,110 146,892 4.2 8th 5,141,220 
1943 1,363,815 59,586 4.4 8th 2,085,510 
1944 998,394 50,021 5.0 6th 1,750,735 
1945 954,572 44,597 4.7 9th 1,560,895 
1946 1,574,505 70,507 4.5 7th 2,467,745 
1947 2,109,185 90,124 4.3 7th 3,154,340 
Source: Roy J. W. Ely, Montana's Production: A Statistical 
Summary of the States Industry. 1930-1949. Bullet.# 13 (Missoula: 
Bureau of Business Research, State University of Montana, 1950), 
47. 
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YEAR SHORT TONS (*) VALUE (**} 
1 9 3 0  4 7 , 4 8 0  $ 8 9 9 , 0 6 5  
1 9 3 1  4 0 , 1 2 3  4 9 4 , 2 8 2  (*) Manganese and manganif-
1 9 3 2  1 5 , 4 7 9  (*** j erous ores, including those 
1 9 3 3  9 , 3 2 0  2 9 7 , 4 5 1  for which no value is shown. 
1 9 3 4  2 2 , 7 9 5  4 0 5 , 9 3 4  
1 9 3 5  1 7 , 6 4 1  3 7 2 , 0 7 9  (**) Excludes value of follow­
1 9 3 6  3 6 , 7 6 3  5 7 3 , 4 5 6  ing quantities of manganifer-
1 9 3 7  4 6 , 4 0 4  8 9 9 , 8 2 1  ous ore: 1930, 11,875 tons; 
1 9 3 8  1 2 , 3 8 8  4 5 3 , 3 6 7  1931, 14,311 tons; 1945, 
1 9 3 9  1 3 , 2 6 0  (  * * * )  5,057 tons, and 1946, 3,816 
1 9 4 0  2 5 , 7 1 5  (  * * *  )  tons, and 1947, 3,671 tons. 
1 9 4 1  5 9 , 5 5 3  ^ *** j 
1 9 4 2  1 4 5 , 5 5 4  ( *** j (***) Not available for publi­
1 9 4 3  1 4 0 , 1 5 6  (  * * *  )  cation. 
1 9 4 4  1 6 0 , 6 7 0  6  , 0 0 1 , 0 0 1  
1 9 4 5  1 5 6 , 9 8 7  6  ,  1 4 6 , 5 9 5  
1 9 4 6  1 4 1 , 3 3 8  4  , 6 4 3 , 0 5 0  
1 9 4 7  1 3 3 , 3 6 0  4  , 1 5 3 , 0 5 4  
Source: Roy J. W. Ely, Montana's Production: A Statistical Summary of 
the States Industry. 1930-1948. Bullet.# 12 (Missoula: Bureau of Business Re­
search, State University of Montana, 1948), 28. 
MANGANESE 
Thousands of Tons 
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YEAR HARVESTED BUSHELS 
1 9 3 0  4 8 1 , 0 0 0  1 ,  7 8 0 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 1  1 7 8 , 0 0 0  4 6 3 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 2  2 1 4 , 0 0 0  1 7 9 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 3  6 4 , 0 0 0  1 9 2 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 4  2 3 , 0 0 0  1 0 6 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 5  6 4 , 0 0 0  2 2 4 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 6  1 6 , 0 0 0  6 4 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 7  1 5 , 0 0 0  4 6 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 8  2 6 , 0 0 0  1 3 0 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 9  8 2 , 0 0 0  3 6 1 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 0  1 0 7 , 0 0 0  7 4 9 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 1  1 4 8 , 0 0 0  8 8 8 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 2  3 3 0 , 0 0 0  2 ,  4 7 5 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 3  5 6 8 , 0 0 0  4 ,  3 7 4 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 4  1 9 9 , 0 0 0  1 /  4 5 3 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 5  3 2 0 , 0 0 0  1 /  3 1 2 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 6  7 0 , 0 0 0  5 1 8 , 0 0 0  
VALUE 
$ 2 , 7 2 3 , 0 0 0  
5 0 0 , 0 0 0  
6 1 4 , 0 0 0  
2 7 6 , 0 0 0  
1 6 1 , 0 0 0  
3 0 2 , 0 0 0  
111 ,000  
7 8 , 0 0 0  
1 9 1 , 0 0 0  
5 3 8 , 0 0 0  
9 3 6 , 0 0 0  
1 , 4 5 6 , 0 0 0  
5 , 3 2 1 , 0 0 0  
1 2 , 2 6 9 , 0 0 0  
3 , 9 3 8 , 0 0 0  
3 , 5 8 2 , 0 0 0  
2 , 3 5 7 , 0 0 0  
Source: Roy J. W. Ely, Montana's Production: A Statistical 
Summary of the States Industry. 1930-1947. Bullet.# 11 (Missoula: Bu­
reau of Business Research, State University of Montana, 1947), 12. 
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YEAR HARVESTED BUSHELS VALUE 
1 9 3 0  2 3 2 , 0 0 0  3  , 8 2 8 , 0 0 0  $ 1  , 6 0 8 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 1  1 2 8 , 0 0 0  1  , 9 2 0 , 0 0 0  7 6 8 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 2  1 4 7 , 0 0 0  3  , 2 3 4 , 0 0 0  8 4 1 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 3  1 3 2 , 0 0 0  1  , 9 8 0 , 0 0 0  7 5 2 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 4  8 4 , 0 0 0  1  , 6 8 0 , 0 0 0  9 9 1 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 5  1 5 1 , 0 0 0  2  , 8 6 9 , 0 0 0  1  , 2 9 1 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 6  5 7 , 0 0 0  7 9 8 , 0 0 0  5 7 5 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 7  9 1 , 0 0 0  2  , 0 9 3 , 0 0 0  1  , 0 8 8 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 8  1 2 7 , 0 0 0  3  , 6 8 3 , 0 0 0  1  , 2 1 5 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 9  1 9 5 , 0 0 0  4  , 5 8 2 , 0 0 0  1  , 6 9 5 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 0  1 8 7 , 0 0 0  4  , 2 0 8 , 0 0 0  1  , 5 9 9 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 1  2 1 5 , 0 0 0  6  , 0 2 0 , 0 0 0  3  , 0 1 0 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 2  4 1 1 , 0 0 0  1 2  , 3 3 0 , 0 0 0  7  , 1 5 1 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 3  5 4 3 , 0 0 0  1 7  , 1 0 4 , 0 0 0  1 4  , 3 6 7 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 4  5 4 3 , 0 0 0  1 6  , 2 9 0 , 0 0 0  1 4  , 6 6 1 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 5  6 7 2 , 0 0 0  1 4  , 7 8 4 , 0 0 0  1 3  , 7 4 9 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 6  8 0 0 , 0 0 0  1 7  , 5 5 0 , 0 0 0  2 0  , 7 0 9 , 0 0 0  
Source: Roy J. W. Ely, Montana's Production: A Statistical 
Summary of the States Industry. 1930-1947. Bullet.# 11 (Missoula: Bu­
reau of Business Research, State University of Montana, 1947), 5. 
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YEAR HARVESTED BUSHELS VALUE 
1 9 3 0  1 2 2 , 0 0 0  1 , 2 2 0 , 0 0 0  $ 7 5 6 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 1  1 0 4 , 0 0 0  1 , 0 0 9 , 0 0 0  5 3 5 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 2  1 8 2 , 0 0 0  2 , 0 3 8 , 0 0 0  8 1 5 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 3  1 7 4 , 0 0 0  1 , 2 8 8 , 0 0 0  7 4 7 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 4  1 0 6 , 0 0 0  5 6 2 , 0 0 0  5 2 8 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 5  2 1 2 , 0 0 0  2 , 2 9 0 , 0 0 0  1 , 7 4 0 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 6  7 6 , 0 0 0  6 8 4 , 0 0 0  7 6 6 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 7  1 4 9 , 0 0 0  1 , 3 4 1 , 0 0 0  8 7 2 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 8  1 6 7 , 0 0 0  2 , 5 0 5 , 0 0 0  1 , 3 2 8 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 9  1 4 5 , 0 0 0  2 , 1 7 5 , 0 0 0  1 , 2 4 0 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 0  2 , 0 6 3 , 0 0 0  2 , 8 5 6 , 0 0 0  1 , 6 5 6 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 1  1 7 8 , 0 0 0  3 , 5 6 0 , 0 0 0  2 , 3 8 5 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 2  1 9 0 , 0 0 0  3 , 8 0 0 , 0 0 0  3 , 0 7 8 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 3  1 7 9 , 0 0 0  3 , 2 2 2 , 0 0 0  3 , 8 3 4 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 4  1 4 0 , 0 0 0  2 , 9 4 0 , 0 0 0  3 , 3 2 2 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 5  1 7 0 , 0 0 0  2 , 2 9 5 , 0 0 0  2 , 8 9 2 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 6  1 8 0 , 0 0 0  2 , 5 2 0 , 0 0 0  3 , 7 8 0 , 0 0 0  
Source: Roy J. W. Ely, Montana's Production: A Statistical 
Summary of the States Industry. 1930-1947. Bullet.# 11 (Missoula: Bu­
reau of Business Research, State University of Montana, 1947), S. 
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GALLONS Source: Roy J. W. Ely, Montana's Produc-
3 3 , 8 9 5 , 1 8 6  tion: A Statistical Summary of the States Industry. 
3 9  0 7 7  0 0 6  1930-1943. Bullet.# 7 (Missoula?Bureau of Busi-
3 4  '  7 4 6  '  4 7 0  n e S S  ^ e s e a r c ^ 1 '  S t a t e  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  M o n t a n a ,  1 9 4 3 ) ,  
3 7 ' 1 8 5 ^  9 7 0  
4 6  9 6 4  7 8 0  " G a s o l i n e  p r o d u c t i o n  i n  M o n t a n a  h a s  r i s e n  r a p i d l y  
m since 1935; in fact, from 1935 to 1940 it has in-
Dl, z o D , z o z  c r e a s e d  m o r e  than 100 per cent. Allowing 650 gal-
6 9 , 5 1 1 , 0 7 1  I o n s  a  y e a r  f o r  e a c h  a u t o m o b i l e  a n d  t r u c k  b e a r i n g  a  
9 1  1 6 2  0 9 7  M o n t a n a  l i c e n s e  p l a t e ,  p r o d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  s t a t e  i n  
n / r ' c o o '  a  c  n  e a c h  o f  t h e  l a s t  t w o  y e a r s  h a s  e x c e e d e d  c o n s u m p -9 6 , 5 2 8 , 4 6 0  t i o n > -  3  v  
1 2 7 , 1 0 2 , 0 4 6  
1 3 0  5 8 3  0 7 9  S o u r c e :  R o v  J .  W .  E l v .  Montana's Produc-
1 a 1 ' c j i c ' r t ^ n  tion: A Statistical Summary of the States 
1 4 1 , 5 4 5 , 0 6 7  Industry. 1930-1941. Bullet.# 5 (Missoula: Bureau 
6 5 , 5 7 8 , 2 6 4  o f  B u s i n e s s  R e s e a r c h ,  S t a t e  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  M o n t a n a ,  
1941), 45. 
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YEAR HARVESTED BUSHELS VALUE 
1 9 3 0  2 8 0 , 0 0 0  4 , 9 0 0 , 0 0 0  $ 1 , 5 6 8 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 1  1 6 0 , 0 0 0  2 , 8 0 0 , 0 0 0  8 4 0 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 2  3 6 8 , 0 0 0  9 , 5 6 8 , 0 0 0  2 , 1 0 5 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 3  3 1 4 , 0 0 0  5 , 3 3 8 , 0 0 0  1 , 7 0 8 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 4  2 0 5 , 0 0 0  5 , 1 2 5 , 0 0 0  2 , 3 0 6 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 5  3 4 8 , 0 0 0  7 , 8 3 0 , 0 0 0  2 , 8 1 9 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 6  1 5 3 , 0 0 0  2 , 5 2 4 , 0 0 0  1 , 3 1 2 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 7  1 9 6 , 0 0 0  4 , 7 0 4 , 0 0 0  1 , 6 9 3 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 8  2 9 8 , 0 0 0  1 0 , 7 2 8 , 0 0 0  2 , 6 8 2 , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 9  3 4 0 , 0 0 0  9 , 3 5 0 , 0 0 0  2 , 6 1 8 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 0  3 7 1 , 0 0 0  1 0 , 5 7 4 , 0 0 0  2 , 9 6 1 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 1  4 0 4 , 0 0 0  1 4 , 5 4 4 , 0 0 0  5 , 6 7 2 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 2  5 2 1 , 0 0 0  2 , 3 1 9 , 0 0 0  8 , 7 3 7 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 3  4 4 8 , 0 0 0  1 7 , 9 2 0 , 0 0 0  1 0 , 5 7 3 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 4  4 0 3 , 0 0 0  1 5 , 7 1 7 , 0 0 0  9 , 1 1 6 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 5  3 2 3 , 0 0 0  9 , 3 6 7 , 0 0 0  5 , 7 1 4 , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 6  3 3 9 , 0 0 0  1 0 , 9 1 2 , 0 0 0  8 , 1 8 4 , 0 0 0  
Source: Roy J. W. Ely, Montana's Production: A Statistical Sum­
mary of the States Industry. 1930-1948. Bullet.# 12 (Missoula: Bureau of 
Business Research, State University of Montana, 1948), 6. 
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YEAR POUNDS CASH INCOME 
1 9 3 0  3 4  , 0 3 4  , 0 0 0  $ 7  , 1 4 7  , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 1  3 8  , 2 1 4  , 0 0 0  5  , 3 5 0  , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 2  3 2  , 5 3 8  , 0 0 0  2  ,  9 2 8  ,  0 0 0  
1 9 3 3  3 3  , 3 7 0  , 0 0 0  7  ,  3 4 1  ,  0 0 0  
1 9 3 4  3 6  , 4 7 2  , 0 0 0  8  ,  3 8 9  , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 5  3 2  , 7 1 2  ,  0 0 0  6  , 2 1 5  , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 6  2 9  ,  3 5 1  , 0 0 0  7  ,  6 3 1  , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 7  2 4  , 8 9 2  , 0 0 0  7  , 9 2 6  , 0 0 0  
1 9 3 8  2 5  , 2 4 5  , 0 0 0  4  , 7 9 7  ,  0 0 0  
1 9 3 9  2 6  ,  3 1 9  , 0 0 0  5  , 7 9 0  ,  0 0 0  
1 9 4 0  2 9  ,  6 2 4  , 0 0 0  8  , 5 9 1  ,  0 0 0  
1 9 4 1  3 3  ,  1 4 9  , 0 0 0  1 1  , 2 7 1  , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 2  3 2  ,  9 6 4  , 0 0 0  1 3  ,  1 8 6  ,  0 0 0  
1 9 4 3  3 0  , 9 4 5  , 0 0 0  1 3  ,  3 0 6  ,  0 0 0  
1 9 4 4  2 7  , 8 6 6  , 0 0 0  1 2  , 2 6 1  , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 5  2 3  ,  7 0 7  ,  0 0 0  1 0  , 4 3 1  , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 6  2 1  , 4 8 5  ,  0 0 0  9  , 2 3 9  , 0 0 0  
1 9 4 7  1 7  , 3 1 7  , 0 0 0  7  , 7 9 3  , 0 0 0  
Source: Roy J. W. Ely, Montana's Produc­
tion: A Statistical Summary of the States Industry. 
1930-1948. Bullet.# 12 (Missoula: Bureau of Busi­
ness Research, State University of Montana, 1948), 
21. 
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Figure 3:1. Comparacive Gain or Loss of Manufacturing, by Region, 1929-54 
+25* or more 
+15* to +25* 
P^+5% to +15% 
-5% to +5* 
3 -15* to -5* 
3 -25* to -15* 
23 -25* or more 
Figure 3:2. Comparative Gain or Loss (Per Cent), Value Added by Manufacture, by 
State, 1929-54 
Victor R. Fuchs, Changes In The Location of Manufacturing In The 
United States Since 1929 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962)p., 4. 
MAJOR SOURCES OF INCOME PAYMENTS TO INDIVIDUALS, 
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Source: U. S. Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics. 
Harold J. Hoflich, The Economy of Montana. (Missoula: Bureau of Busi­
ness and Economic Research, school of Business Administration, 1951), P., 52. 
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APPENDIX - B 
TULLie LAY. -—ci:. TV*-CRC-C 2( :IT#?-
TITLE I—INDIVIDUAL ANl! C071T CT.ATIGN 
INCOME T.-OCZS 
108 
Par: I—Amendment- u> Chapter 1 
EEC 101. TAXABLE YEAP.5 TO TVHICH AMENDMENTS AIT LIT AEll. 
Except as others-is? expressly provide:1.. t:i. amoi::"r:v.-:.is i:.acU 
"by thi^ title shall b:- apwicabie oniy v;:t"u rc?:>'.-cx k. ye-.:-
beginning after December 31, U'41. 
BEC 102. NORMAL TAX ON INDIVIDUALS. 
» V*k c sopp. i. Section 11 is amended to read as follows: 
I u. 
-SEC. 11. NORMAL TAX OX INDIVIDUALS. 
'There shall he levied, rollecte»\. r.rd r>ai:l for each taxable vpr.r 
upon the net income of every individual a normal ta~. ( f C pe: cenVur.: 
of the amount of the net income in excess of the credits against net 
^ income provided in section 25. CFor alternative rax. if gross income 
§arp. i. Tii ' from certain sources is S3.000 or less, see section 409).*' 
pot:, pi- 8ii. sis. I£S. 8TT, 825. 8Ji-
SEC. 103. SURTAX ON INDIVIDUALS. 
~c u *s c supp i Section 12 (b) is amended to read a? follow?: 
inai .  "(b) RATES OF SOTTAS.—There shall  be levied. rollcrtfd.  and paid 
for each taxable year upon the surtax net income of ev^ry individual 
the surtax shovm in the following table :  
*Tf the Eurtai ret income is: The sort-ax shall be: 
Nor over _ — . _ J?C> oi tbe sn rtas Det income. 
Over ?- <"*"*' but D' * over $4.nO0 SJw'i. p%i:s ir.'-c of esce=s ; over S 2.O00. 
Over f-i.ooa t>Ui n^r over $0.rv>.» S">0. plus -n<Te of excess i over S-1.000. 
O^er Jfi.fwi but D--.: over 55 (>>' f 'SO. plus 1-iTr of excess • over 5( 
Crrer Sj.'V*'1 bu: Dn; orer Sl-VV*".' SI.-400. plus 2> <~r of excess or^r JS/KO. 
Ortr but no: over S12.000 p!':? 
SK'.OOO. 
O .1 ̂  of e^rc.^ ovc:-
Over $12.'Xv bu: no: over $14.000 $2.r.f/'. pi us 
512.000. 
3G7r of eioess over 
Over SI 4.000 bu: no: over 516.000 SC.."SO. plus 
SI 4.000. 
40Cc of excess ov^r 
Over S1G.000 but no: over SIS:000... S4.1?'.', 
51<vOOO. 
43 7c of excess over 
Over Sl>»j b-^r over S-'\000 S"/1-}''1. plus 
SIS.00a 
401 cf excess over 







1 t 1 5".f'''A plus 
S-'C.OOO. 
i:<rc of excess over 
Orer S2C.000 but not over S20.OO0 SG.imO. plus 
S22.000 
52 rf of excess over 
Over. 52C.(»>0 but not over S32.000... Sf'.fCO. plus 
S26.0O0. 
ri-rc of excels over 
Over ST.2.C-X' but nc-r over S3S.000... S12."20. plus of exce>£ over 
" $."2,000. 
Over 53S.fW> b'it nor over 544.000 Sl.~.?oo. plus 
S3S.HX). 
cic< of excess over 
Over bu: not over 5.-'.\OCO 510.4G0. plus 
544.000. 
C37c of exc^s over 
Over S30.000 be: nor over 560.000 523.240. plus 
s.-o.ooo. 
€C 7c of excess over 
Over SGO.OO!* but not over JT0.000._- S20.&40. plus 
560.000. 
609c of excess over 
Over STO.OOO but cot over 5SO.OOO 53G.740. plus 
*70.000. 
7 27c of excess over 
Over S50.'X>0 bu: over 5PO.OOO S43.a-;n plus 
5^0.000. 
T jn> of excess over 
Over JCiO.OOO but not over 5100,000— 531.440. plus 
590.00C'. 
~~7c of excess over 
56 STAT.] 77TH CONG., 2D SESS.—CH. 619—OCT. 21, 1942 
"If the surtax net income is: The surtax shall be: 
Over $100,000 but not over $1.30.000. S30.14O. plus 70<7c of excess over 
S100.000. 
Over $130,000 but not over $200,000. 59S.640. plus 81 fe of excess over 
5150.000. 
Orer $200,000 $130,140. plus S2To of excess over 
$200,000."' 
SEC. 104. OPTIONAL TAX ON INDIVIDUALS WITH GROSS INCOME 
FROM CERTAIN SOURCES OF 53,000 OR LESS. 
(a) OPTIONAL TAX RATI:.®.—Section 400 (relating to optional tax) 
is amended to read as follows: 
-SEC. 400. IMPOSITION OF TAX. 
"In lieu of the tax imposed under sections 11 and 12, an individual 
who makes his return on the cash basis may elect, for each taxable 
year, to pay the tax shown in the following table if his gross income 
for such taxable year is $3,000 or less and consists wholly of one or 
more of the following: Salary, wages, compensation for personal 
services, dividends. intere5t. or annuities: 
109 
S3 Stmt. 689. 
2^ U. S. C., Supp. I, I <00. 
Artit, p. 802. 
S3 its:, i. 
26 C. S. C. 
Bapp. I. | 12. 
Patt, p. 8A8. 
» IS 
The Lai shall be 
**If the grosa income is 
orer— Sinc'e person 





(1*) Married peraoo 
«bo«e *poa*e has 
no gro&s income or 
{21 Married per­
son making joint 
return or (3) Had 
of 'amily 
so £525 so so 10 
So 23 550 i 0 0 
$350 0 4 0 0 
$375 600 7 0 0 
$600... 625 11 0 0 
•1625 650 15 0 0 
S650 675 20 3 0 
$675.. 700 24 6 0 
S700 725 2S 9 0 
S725 750 33 14 0 
S750 1 1 0 37 IS 0 
$775 800 41 22 0 
$800 825 46 27 0 
$825 850 50 31 0 
$850 875 54 35 0 
$875 900 59 40 0 
S900. 925 63 44 0 
S925 950 67 43 0 
S950 975 71 52 0 
S975 1. 000 76 57 0 
51,000 1, 025 80 61 0 
$1.025 1, 050 84 65 0 
S 1.050 1, 075 89 70 0 
Si,075 1. 100 93 74 0 
$1.100 1, 125 97 78 0 
$1,125 - 1, 150 102 83 0 
$1,150 1, 175 106 •S7 0 
$1,175— 1, 200 110 91 0 
$1,200 1. 225 115 96 0 
$1,225 1, 250 119 100 0 
$1,250... 1, 275 123 104 0 
?1.275 1. 300 12S 109 1 
$1,300... 1. -325 132 113 4 
$1,325 1. 350 136 117 ! 
SI.350 1. 375 141 J 10 
SI.375 — 1. 400 145 126 1J 
SI,400 1. 425 149 130 17 
SI,425 1. 450 1=4 13-=. 21 
SI,450 1. 475 i *•* 13*' _ J 
SI,473 - i. ;no • > •> - "7 •> 73 
SI,500 1. 525 ' : 7 149 24 
804 Prune laws—CK —ocr. c: 
Tn t_r -n-: 110 
""If Ibe grot* income j*. 
ore*— Bui not o*r— 
i 
i:rr v pr>--
•no: : u.~ k aepxru; 
rel arc 
» ' - . " y c - r  r--' 
no froi.- ir.rorn- o* 
11 >ia-ri«-c prr-
can ou.Linr join; 
Tirxvrrk o: He*c 
of LtfniJ-
51, 550 s:7? 5152 
SI, 550 ; 1, 575 l . O  i 156 42 
SI,575 1 1.600 ISO 101 47 
SI,600.. 1. 625 164 165 51 
51,625 ; 1.650 16S 109 c. t 
*1.650 ! 1.675 193 174 60 
$1,675 1 1. 700 lf-7 178 64 
SI,700 ! 1,725 201 1S2 68 
81,725 I 1,750 206 157 73 
51,750 1. 775 210 191 ..77 
SI,775 i 1. 800 214 195 ' 61 
SI.600 ; 1. 825 2!f 1^0 85 
51.825 1. 650 223 204 90 
51,650 1. 875 I 227 208 94 
51,675 1. 900 231 1 O Jt 9S 
51,900 1. 925 | 236 217 103 
Si,925 1, 950 240 oil 107 
SI.950.. ! 1.975 24-5 on 111 
S1.97 o , 2. 000 24V 230 116 
52,000 1 2. 025 253 234 120 
S2.025 2. 05d 257 23* 124 
52.050 2. 075 202 243 129 
$2,075 2. 100 26C 247 133 
52.100 2. 125 270 251 137 
52.125 2, 150 275 256 142 
52.150 2. 175 279 260 146 
52.175 2. 200 2S3 264 150 
52 200 ... 2, 225 2SS 269 155 
52 225 2, 250 292 273 159 
52.250 2. 275 296 277 163 
52.275. 2. 300 301 2«o loS 
$2.300 2. 325 305 2>6 172 
52 325 2. 3-iO 309 2<J0 176 
?2,3.">0 2. 375 314 295 151 
52.375 2. 400 318 299 1S5 
52.400 2. 425 322 303 1S9 
52 425 2. 450 327 308 194 
S2.450 2. 475 331 312 19S 
52-575... 2. 500 335 316 202 
52.500 2. 525 3-iO 321 207 
52.525 2. 550 344 325 211 
52.550 2. 575 34S 329 215 
52.575 2. 600 353 334 220 
52.600 2. 625 357 338 224 
52.625 2, 650 361 342 223 
52.650 2. 675 366 347 233 
S2.675 2. 700 371 351 237 
52.700 2, 725 376 355 241 
S2.725 2. 750 3S1 359 245 
52.750 2. 775 386 364 250 
52,775 2. 800 391 369 254 
52.800 2. 825 396 31 4 25S 
S2.S25 2. 850 401 379 263 
S2.S50 2. 875 406 3S4 267 
52.875 2, 900 411 3S9 271 
52,000 2. 925 . 416 394 276 
S2.S25 2, 950 421 399 280 
S2.950 2. 975 426 404 284 
$2,975 - 3, 000 431 409 289 
Kidem*10115 tor ^ applying the above schedule to determine the tax of a taxpayer 
with one or more dependents there ehall be subtracted from his gross 
income $385 for each such dependent." 
U.S. Pulic Law 753, "Title I INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATION 
INCOME TAXES." 21 Oct., 1942. Statuates at large. 77th CONG., 2ns SESS. 
Vol. 56, Pt. 1. pp., 802 804. 
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Renuevo a uestra Excelencia el testimonio de mi mas alt a v dis-
tinguida consideraci6n. 
Excelentfsimo senor GEORGE S. MESSERSMITH, 
Embajador Ehtraordinario y Plenipotenciario 




DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 
UNITED MEXICAN STATES 
MEXICO CITY 
317 MEXICO CITT, April 26. 1943. 
MR. AMBASSADOR: 
"With relation to the conversations held in this Department between 
representatives of the Embassy in Your Excellency s charge and of 
the Farm Security Administration, on the one hand, and of the De­
partments of Gobemacion. of Agriculture y Fomento. of Labor and 
Social Welfare and of this Department of Foreign Relations, on the 
other, with the object of examining the amendments which it would 
be proper to introduce in the arrangement of August 4. 1942. relative 
to agricultural workers who enter the United States to render their 
services, it is a pleasure for me to make the following statement to 
Your Excellency: 
The Government of Mexico, which is pleased to render this collab­
oration to that of the United States of America, is grateful for the 
spirit of understanding evidenced by the representatives of the 
Embassy and of the Farm Security Administration and. in view 
thereof, takes the liberty of submitting-to Your Excellency s approval 
the text which would amend the above-mentioned arrangement of 
August 4, 1942. in the understanding that these amendments will 
apply both to the workers who were engaged under the arrangement 
in question and to those who have been engaged and will continue to 
be engaged in accordance with the request of the United States 
Government. The amendments to the arrangement of August 4, 
1942, are written in capitals: 
[Here follows the text of the revised agreement, the English version 
of which appears on p. 1158.] 
In case Your Excellency, as I hope, considers the text of the arrange­
ment acceptable as it is set forth in the foregoing sections, it will be 
sufficient for you to communicate it to me in writing for the same to 
come into force. 
I renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest and most 
distinguished consideration. 
E. PADILLA 
His Excellency GEOTIGE S. MESSERSHITH, 
i - ioJcr  Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary 
oj the T'riicd States oj Amcrica. 
City. 
. 4 i i r i ,  Z .  1 1 5 2 .  
EMBASSY OF THE 
UX:TED STATES OF AMERICA 
1214 Mcxico. D.F., April £6, 1943. 
EXCELLENCY: 
I liuv>- the honor to refer T O  the note No. 317 dated April 26. 1943 
ir. which our Excellency formulate> certain proposids made by the 
so sia.. Mexican Government for making the Agreement of August 4, 1942 
between the Governments of the United States of America and Mexico 
a more workable instrument under which Mexican agricultural work­
ers may be recruited in Mexico to work in the United States for a 
temporary period. 
The United States representatives who have been discussing the 
proposed changes -with the representatives designated by the Mexican 
Government for this purpose have been gratified by the generous 
spirit of cooperation which has animated these discussions and which 
has helped to bring them to a successful conclusion. 
I am incorporating into this note the text of the Agreement of 
August 4, 1942 and indicating by underlining, those additions or 
changes agreed upon by my Government: 
"In order to effect a satisfactory arrangement wherebv Mexi­
can agricultural labor may be made available for use in the 
United States and at the same tune provide means wherebv this 
labor will be adequately protected while out of Mexico, the fol­
lowing general provisions are suggested: 
"General Provisions 
"1) It is understood that Mexicans contracting to work in 
the United States shall not be engaged in any military service. 
"2) Mexicans entering the United States as a result of this 
understanding shall not sufi'er discriminatory net? of any kind in 
accordance with the Executive Order No. 8S02 issued at the White 
gr;CFP"*Cuc;'i:Upp'' House June 25. 1941. 
"3) Mexicans entering the United States under this under­
standing shall enjoy the guarantees of transportation, living 
expenses and repatriation established in Article 29 of che Mexi­
can Federal Labor Law as follows: 
'Article 29.—All contracts entered into by Mexican workers for 
lending their services outside their country, shall be made in 
writing, legalized by the municipal authorities of the locality 
where entered into and visaed by the Consul of the country 
where their services are being used. Furthermore, such con­
tract shall contain, as a requisit of validity of same, the following 
stipulations, without which the contract is invalid: 
'I. Transportation and subsistence expenses for the worker, 
and his family, if such is the case, and all other expenses which 
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originate from point of origin to border points and compliance of 
immigration requirements, or for any other similar concept, shall 
be paid exclusively by the employer or the contractual parties. 
'II. The worker shall be paid in full the salary agreed upon, 
from which no deductions shall be made in any amount for any 
of the concepts mentioned in the above sub-paragraph. 
'III. The employer or contractor shall issue a bond or con­
stitute a deposit in cash in the Bank of Workers, or in the absence 
of same, in the Bank of Mexico, to the entire satisfaction of the 
respective labor authorities, for a sum equal to repatriation costs 
of the worker and his family, and those originated by trans­
portation to point of origin. 
'Once the employer establishes proof of having covered such 
expenses or the refusal of the worker to return to his country, 
and that he does not owe the worker any sum covering salary or 
indemnization to which he might have a right, the labor authori­
ties shall authorize the return of the deposit or the cancellation 
of the bond issued.' 
"It is specifically understood that the provisions of Section 
III of Article 29 above-mentioned shall not apply to the Govern­
ment of the United States notwithstanding the inclusion of this 
section in the agreement, in view of the obligations assumed by 
the United States Government under Transportation (a) and 
(c) of this agreement. 
"4) Mexicans entering the United States under this under­
standing shall not be employed to displace other workers, or for 
the purpose of reducing rates of pay previously established. 
"In order to implement the application of the general prin­
ciples mentioned above the following specific clauses are estab­
lished : 
"(When the word 'employer' is used hereinafter it shall be 
understood to mean the Farm Security Administration of the 
Department of Agriculture of the United States of America; 
the word ' sub-employer' shall mean the owner or operator of the 
farm or farms in the United States on which the Mexican will be 
employed; the word 'worker" hereinafter used shall refer to the 
Mexican farm laborer entering the United States under this 
understanding.) 
"Contracts 
"n. Contracts will be made between the employer and the 
worker under the supervision of the Mexican Government. 
(Ci>mrac:s must be written in Spanish.) 
"V"~"11K DIIVINYC: snaT. evAcr lino n contrnci vc-itn tlie sur>-
empioycr. with n view to proper observance of the principles-
ciui>i.iaii'd in tiii.=- undi-rstiiiidui^:. 
" i?*inr 
';a. Th-.> Mexican health authorities will, at the place whence 
the "worker comes, see that he meets the necessary physical 
conditions. 
" Transportation 
'"a. All transportation and living expenses from the place of 
origin to destination, and return, as well as expenses incurred in 
the fulfillment of any requirements of a migratory nature shall 
be met by the employer. 
"b. Personal belongings of the workers up to a maximum of 
35 kilos per person shall be transported at the expense of the 
employer. 
"c. In accord with the intent of Article 29 of the Mexican 
Federal Labor Law. quoted under General Provisions (3) above, 
it is expected that the employer will collect all or part of the cost 
accruing under (a) and (b) of Transportation from the sub-
employer. 
" TTa.ofS and Employment 
"a. (11 Wages to be paid the worker shall be the same as those 
paid for similar work to other agricultural laborers under the 
same conditions within the same area, in the respective regiops 
of destination. Piece rates shall be so set as to enable the 
worker of average ability to earn the prevailing wage. In any 
case wages for piece work or hourly work will not be less than 
30 cents per hour. 
"a. (2) On the basis of prior authorization from the Mexican 
Government salaries lower than those established ill the previous 
clause may be paid those emigrants admitted into the Uniied 
States as members of the family of the worker under contract 
and who. when they are in the field, are able also to become agri­
cultural laborers but who, by their condition of age or sex. cannot 
carry but the average amount of ordinary work. 
"b. The worker shall be exclusively employed as an agricul­
tural laborer for which he has been engaged: any change from 
such type of employment or any change of locality shall be 
made with the express approval of the worker and with the 
authority of the Mexican Government. 
'"c. There shall be considered illegal any collection by reason 
of commission or for any other concept demanded of the worker. 
"d. Work of minors under 14 years shall be strictly prohibited, 
and they shall ha.ve the same schooling opportunities as those 
enjoyed by children of other agricultural laborers. 
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"e. Workers domiciled in the migratory labor camps or at anv 
other place of employment under this understanding shall be 
free to obtain articles for their personal consumption, or that of 
their families, wherever it is most convenient for them. 
"f. The Mexican workers will be furnished without cost to 
them with hygienic lodgings, adequate to the physical conditions 
of the region of a type used by a common laborer of the region 
and the medical and sanitary services enjoyed also without cost 
to them will be identical with those furnished to the other agri­
cultural workers in the regions where they may lend their services. 
"g. "Workers admitted under this understanding shall enjoy as 
regards occupational diseases and accidents the same guarantees 
enjoyed by other agricultural workers under United States legis­
lation. 
"h. Groups of workers admitted under this understanding shall 
elect their own representatives to deal with the employer, but 
it is understood that all such representatives shall be working 
members of the group. 
"The Mexican Consuls, assisted by the Mexican Labor Inspec­
tors, recognized as such by the employer will take all possible 
measures of protection in the interests of the Mexican workers 
in all questions affecting them, within their corresponding juris­
dictions, and will have free access to the places of work of the 
Mexican workers. The employer will observe that the sub-
employer grants all facilities to the Mexican Consuls and the 
Assistant Labor Inspectors of the Mexican Government for the 
compliance of all the clauses in this contract. 
"i. For such time as they are unemployed under a period equal 
to 75% oi the period (exclusive of Sundays) for which the workers 
have been contracted they shall receive a subsistence allowance 
at the rate of $3.00 per day. 
"For the remaining 25% of the period for which the workers 
have been contracted during which the workers may be unem­
ployed when such unemployment is not due to their unwilling­
ness to work they shall receive lodging and subsistence without 
cost to them. \ 
"Should the cost of living rise this will be a matter for reconsid­
eration. 
"The master contracts for workers submitted to the Mexican 
Government shall contain definite provisions for computation of 
subsistence and payments under this understanding. 
"j. The term of the contract shall be made in accordance with 
the authorities of the respective countries. 
"k. At the expiration of the contract under this understanding, 
and ii the same is not renewed, the authorities of the United 
jri-it?; shaii consider illegal. liom an immigration point of view, 
1:1 • ^onnnuoc: ?;oy o: the worker in the terrilory of the United 
States, exception made of cases of physical impossibility. 
"Savinai Fund 
'•a. Tiif respective agencies of the Government of the United 
States shall i>f responsible for the safekeeping of the sums con­
tributed by the Mexican -workers toward the formatiou of their 
Rural Savings Fund, until such sums are transferred to the 
Wells Farpo Bank and Union Trust Company of San Francisco 
for the account of the Bank of Mexico. S. A., which will transfer 
such amounts to the Mexican Agricultural Credit Bank. This 
last shall assume responsibility for the deposit, for the safekeeping 
and for the application, or in the absence of these, for the return 
of Buch amounts. 
"b. The Mexican Government through the Banco de Credito 
Agricola will take care of the security of the savings of the workers 
to be used for payment of the agricultural implements, which may 
be made available to the Banco de Credito Agricola in accordance 
with exportation permits for shipment to Mexico with the under­
standing that the Farm Security Administration will recommend 
priority treatment for such implements. 
"lumbers: 
"As it is impossible to determine at this time the number of 
workers who may be needed in the United States for agricultural 
labor employment, the employer shall advise the Mexican Govern­
ment from time to time as to the number needed. The Govern­
ment of Mexico shall determine in each case the number of workers 
who may leave the country without detriment to its national 
economy. 
General Considerations 
"It is understood that, -with reference to the departure from 
Mexico of Mexican workers, who are not farm laborers, there shall 
govern in understandings reached by agencies of the respective 
Governments the same fundamental principles which have been 
applied here to the departure of farm labor. 
"It is understood that the employers will cooperate with such 
other agencies of the Government of the United States in carrying 
this understanding into effect whose authority uuder the laws of 
the United States are such as to contribute to the effectuation of 
the understanding. 
"Either Government shall have the right to renounce this 
understanding, giving appropriate notification to the other 
Government 90 days in advance. 
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"This understanding may be formalized by an exchange of 
notes between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Mexico and the Embassy of the United States of America in 
Mexico." 
In accepting the above text as the arrangement under which Mexi­
can Agricultural workers shall be recruited and employed in agri­
cultural work in the United States my Government agrees that all the 
conditions set forth in the revised agreement will apply equally to 
those agricultural workers already in the United States or on their 
way to the United States under individual work agreements as well 
as to those who may be recruited for such work in the future. 
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest and most 
distinguished consideration. 
G. S. MESSERSMITH 
His Excellency 
Senor Licenciado EZEQTIEL PADILLA, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Mexico, D. F 
U.S. "MEXICO-MIGRATION OF AGRICULTURAL WORKERS." 26 April, 
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